1914 – 1920

Chapter 4. Albert goes to war

On 23 August 1914, the German 1^st Army of General Alexander von Kluck arrived at Cateau – a village on the edge of Mons. They were following the Schlieffen Plan to outflank the Allies – to cut them off – from using the channel ports. The BEF was made up of four regular army divisions arranged as 1st Corps under Douglas Haig and II Corps led by Horace Smith-Dorrien.

Three hours later eight German battalions advanced against two battalions of the 3^rd Infantry Division. D and B Companies of the 4^th Middlesex Regiment were overwhelmed by the 31^s. 85^th and 86^th German Fusilier Regiments. These three comprised the German 18^th Division – forced the British back towards Paris. By mid-day, the British began a withdrawal. To assist them, they quested reinforcement from the 2^nd Battalion Royal Irish.

The 1/13^th [County of London] Princess Louise’s Kensington Battalion, The County of London Regiment was mobilised on the 4^th August 1914, two days after boarding the train for summer camp. They were to form part of the then 24^th Brigade, 8^th Division. Ninety thousand men descended upon Southampton and Portsmouth to board ships for Boulogne, Rouen and Le Havre, under the command of Sir John French… Their destination was Maubeuge. The Army was made up of four infantry and one cavalry division. A division at this time equalled about eighteen thousand men – this sum included support troops. Two or more divisions made up a corps and two or more corps made an army.

The landings were completed by the middle of August. Almost immediately they had gone into the line alongside the French Army, trying to stem the tide of the German advance. The object was to hold the line located by the Mons-Conde Canal in Belgium. The British Expeditionary Force was stationed on the left of the Allied Forces directly in front of the advancing 1^st German Army Commanded by Alexander von Kluck. In manpower the German and French armies were equal at a million each.

The British totalled eighty thousand. The German Schlieffen Plans, which entailed encircling the Allies, had been carefully planned long in advance. The BEF were crucial in keeping the line intact by stopping the German right wing. Whilst the British troops were heavily engaged the French 5^th Army was engaged with the German 2^nd and 3^rd armies at the Battle of Charleroi. The French Army Commander, General Lanrezac instructed Field Marshal Sir John French, the BEF Commander to hold the line for twenty-four hours. The BEF dug them in preparation for the onslaught that was bound to happen.

The battle opened at dawn on the 23^rd August, with a German bombardment. There were four bridges over the canal… these the Germans had to force. Advancing in close-order, parade ground fashion, the advancing Germans were skittle down and forced to retire in confusion. Another attack tried only this time in loose formation being more successful – using the plantations of fir-trees to shield them. On the right of the Royal Fusiliers were the Kensingtons and Gordon Highlanders. Both suffered grievously. Fortunately the reserve battalion, the Royal Irish, gave sufficient steadying power to hold the bridges. Throughout the day the British II Corps held out. It was obvious to all that holding the bridges was not going to last. The Kensingtons had suffered 15 officers and 353 killed or wounded, nearly half the total. To the east the Germans had penetrated the perimeter turning the right flank.

This British Army was the original Old Contemptibles and considered Britain’s finest troops capable of rapid, accurate firing with their Lee-Enfield rifles, capable of 15 aimed shots a minute. Albert was a champion shot representing the regiment at Bisley. He was capable of double that figure.

At 15.00 hours the British 3^rd Divisions was ordered to retire to the south of Mons. Straightening the line the 5^th Division also retired, establishing a line through the villages. As news was received about the French collapse – pulling back exposing the British right flank, a further withdrawal was scheduled for that night. It was an invidious position to be in. There had not been time to organise a proper holding action. The British Army was now holding a defensive line on the Valenciennes to the Maubeuge Road… All the time the Germans were advancing. This retreat lasted two weeks and covered 250 miles. The battle had been won by the Germans although at a tremendous price [5,000 casualties]. The advance nearly took them to Paris.

The remainder of the German 1^st Army had by this time arrived. Although the Germans advanced they lost considerably more men – it was considered a great strategic withdrawal… saving the French line from total collapse. The 4^th Royal Fusiliers defended the northern approaches to Mons. The remainder of D and B Companies of the Kensingtons retreated to St Symphorien cemetery on the outskirts of Mons. Early that afternoon the British could see they were unable to withstand the pressure. The French army was retreating south together with the Belgian army. The British had their flank exposed and in danger of being cut off, falling back to Etreux on the 27^th August. It was claimed the ‘Angels of Mons’ had aided the British army. This was the first major action of the British Expeditionary Force – the retreat from Belgium to the Marne. The BEF was then moved to Flanders to be in easy reach of their supply base at the channel ports… arriving the second week of October.

The fighting in Belgium and France was along traditional lines, which was of armies surging backwards and forwards… in what is known as engaging forward and retiring movements. At the beginning of September the Allied retreat slowed down as the Germans lost impetus, becoming further from their supply base. This resulted in the Battle of the Marne which halted the German spearhead lasting until the middle of the month. After the battle it was decided to move the BEF north to Flanders convenient to the channel ports. Travelling by train III Corps reached Abbeville on the 8^th October, II Corps a day later and I Corps following on. On the 11^th October IV Corps found itself close to Bruges and Ghent. Three days later the last gap in the Allied line was secured. The BEF held the line from Le Bassee to the river Douve… The French held the southern flank.

Early on 3^rd November 1914, the Kensington Battalion marched behind their band to Watford and took the train for Southampton. Embarkation was complete by the following morning. The Battalion sailed for Le Havre which came in sight by midday… There they were marched off to Rest Camp 1. The next day, mounting railway trucks they steamed off for St Omer grasping their long Lee-Enfield rifles reaching their destination on the 6^th. A period of training followed at Blendecques. The major battle that first year for the British was the 1^st Battle of Ypres fought October 19^th. By the BEF under the command of Field Marshal Sir John French. That month the Allies had reached Nieuport on the North Sea coast. The Germans captured Antwerp and forced its defender back. The 8^th Division had been redeployed north to join two divisions of reinforcements recently landed in Belgium. They advanced east from St Omer, halting the German forces at the Passchendaele Ridge. The Division was lined up from La Bassee to Messines, there was little activity but you could hear the battle raging to the north. The French Army Command and General Foch believed a coordinated attack would result in the recapture of the industrial city of Lille, then Belgium finally capturing Brussels. The German general Falkenhayn had other opinions. He ordered the capture of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. He struck the Belgian defences on the Yser River.

By far it was the worst battle fought – there was an almighty clash of troops. Only a few miles down the road was Ypres. There was constant hand to hand fighting as the battle swayed from one side to the other. The problem for the British was that the position was vulnerable to superior German artillery. The British made a stand which formed a salient around Ypres, the Battle becoming ‘The Massacre of the Innocents at Ypres. The Innocents were eight German units of young volunteers, many of them students. Almost immediately there came the four day Battle of the Aisne. The method of waging war changed to one of stagnation as each side settled down and dug Battle Lines. Henceforth the artillery and its insatiable appetite for ammunition and the strung barbed wire developed into the Western Front. The line from Ypres to Nieuport was held by the Belgians; Bethune, Lens, Arras, Bapaume, Verdun, and St Quentin were to become synonymous with great suffering and death.

At the start of November 1914, the Kensingtons were attached to the 8^th Division as part of the 25^th Infantry Brigade. The Brigade included the 2^nd Lincolnshire’s, 2^nd Royal Berkshires, 1^st Royal Irish Rifles and the 2^nd Rifle Brigade. The 8^th Division was allocated a four mile stretch alongside the La Bassee Road and La Rue Tilleloy, just in front of the village of Laventie. This was referred to as the La Bassee Front and lay opposite Aubers Ridge north-east of Bethune, in Patois.

The last major attack on the British lines occurred on the 11^th November. This battle became famous because it was made by the Prussian Guards and they broke through the British lines. A counter-attack by the 1^st Guards Division was forced to take shelter in the woods before driven out by a counter-attack. The fighting secured the close bonding between the British and the French. The two armies fought side by side all around Ypres in a fashion not used in earlier battles. The more the Germans extended their lines the more the Allied troops did too as the front stretched northwards up past Bapaume, Arras and Bethune… onwards to Ypres. During the 14^th November 1914 the Kensingtons marched to Estaires. This small mill town on the banks of the Lys was to become very familiar to the Battalion. The low-lying land around the river and bridge; the lined cobbled roads shaded by tall poplars on either side echoed to the sound of marching feet.

The 8^th Division was part of General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s IV Corps… he inspected the Kensingtons that Sunday, after the Battalion had reorganised itself – into a four-company structure. He recognised the enormous efforts made and made reference to it. The 8^th Division went into the line just south of the Belgian frontier, close to Armentieres.

By the end of November the terrible battles died down, both armies were spent forces needing to reform. The Salient came to be attached to the Belgian names of the farms, villages and features – Mouse Trap Farm, Cheddar Villa, Polygon Wood, Sanctuary Wood, Hill 60, and many more At Neuve Chappelle the 1^st Battalion lost 160 men even though they had broken the German lines. The losses at Aubers Ridge were even higher, reducing the battalion by thirty per cent. There were several awards granted and the gallant action by Captain Kimber rated a DSO. Over to the northeast a village on a ridge provided cover and observation posts for the German observers. They could see all that was going on. For the next four years this ridge was to become a raging sore, the landscape a pulverised mass of pocked marked soil… this was Passchendaele. The Battle of Aisne ended on the 13^th November 1914, the last battle of the first year of war. By December, the Germans decided to call off their offensive and to dig in – to resume the battle in the spring.

Back in England in early October parts of the 8^th Division were forming up at Hursley Park near Winchester. Amongst them were the 2^nd Battalion Kensingtons.  In the last days of December 1914, twenty-two Territorial battalions marched to join that British Force in France and within two further months, another twenty-six followed them. After the terrible casualties the 1^st London Division was split up to provide reinforcements for other Divisions. As a result of these battles – the loss of so many men, not just in the Kensingtons but also in other parts of the division. The 1^st London was split up to provide reinforcements and substitutions for those killed. By March 1915 it ceased to exist as a unit… later that month, thankfully it was reconstituted – the gaps made good by men from the 2^nd Battalion… together they were numbered the 56^th London Division.

The First Battle of Champagne took place between Reims and Verdun. The French pressed relentlessly against the German positions. The Germans were better at maintaining their front against repeated gallant attempts by the French. The whole of that year was a success for the Germans achieving striking victories against the Russians, whilst joining forces with Bulgaria to complete the conquest of Serbia.

That Christmas both sides were exhausted, the terrible weather the previous summer and autumn convinced the Generals on both sides that battle should be joined in the spring. The men gathered in the trenches trying to make the best of it trying to keep warm. During this period the territorial units, landing and marching to the front in September and October were initiated into trench warfare. As such they were given an easy time to acclimatise and learn the ropes. The first spring battles were as much to demonstrate to their allies that they were willing to engage the enemy. Neuve Chappelle was on high ground looking down on Lille.

Chapter 5. Fighting their way out of trouble

The 1st Kensington Battalion was attached to the 25^th Brigade, 8^th Division – as a regular division, engaging in their first major action at Neuve Chapelle. As with all newly formed groups. This battle was planned as a local offensive mission involving the 7^th and 18^th Divisions. The Indian Corps, with the 14^th Corps being to the north. The goal was Aubers Ridge and the ground beyond.

The Kensingtons were relieved on March 1^st, and for the first time the four companies were united in billets in La Francas Mill, occupying Lines of Communications, a term used to describe troops who assisted the forward battle-lines with ammunition and stores – the job of the Ammunition Column was to keep the supply of shells going up to the front, from the dump in the rear; Lines of Communication troops became the reserves, pioneer support groups, communications staff, engaged in the construction of support trenches, unloading railway carriages, and making sure the rations got through – a host of other tasks all to relieve the forward troops. Most of this work was done at night with the Battalion horse teams. [The BEF had sixty-thousand horses to supply all arms.] The Kensingtons now joined the re-formed 1^st London 56th Division in the 168^th Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Granville George Loch, on the 8^th February 1916.

The 1^st Battalion camped outside the town walls of St Omer – a small provincial town with cobbled roads and looking very French. The large camp had been erected adjacent to the main road, wagons and gun limbers lined the outside walls. Bell tents accommodating eight men with duck board floors were lined up in the field opposite. The ground was much used making the main paths muddy and bare of grass. Ditches circled the fields under thorn hedges.

After all the preceding battles the Kensingtons were down to fifty fit men together with the rest of the 25^th Brigade, they moved out and marched from Lestrem on March 9^th equipped to move to the front. A meal was prepared and water bottles filled after which the battalion took up position in the support trenches. At 7.30 on the 10^th the artillery bombardment began preparing the advance to begin half an hour later. The assault troops rose up clambering over the trench sides and surged forwards. Despite the casualties the advance continued with the supporting troops passing through – to keep up the momentum. The Kensingtons meanwhile, a quarter of an hour later, moved forward from their support trench into the now empty breastworks to prepare for the follow-up – to attack the second objective.

The 25^th Brigade had not been so fortunate. They were on the left of the Divisional front supported by the 24^th Brigade. They had moved off before the advancing troops had totally cleared the way. Although by 1pm the objective had been reached the Germans had recovered, beginning to strengthen their lines. That night neither side was aware what the morning would bring the three-day event met with only limited initial success. Again the early gains were not exploited – there being a serious lack of coordination. The supple of bombs and ammunition was lacking – the forward troops were nervous about pressing on too far.

The next morning further attempt was made to drive the enemy out of the ruins of the village but the Germans were well concealed and protected by the collapsed houses making the village into a stronghold. They began to put down a fierce artillery bombardment on the attacking Kensingtons who were cut down.

The battle for Neuve Chapelle collapsed and what had been gained consolidated by rebuilding the parapet and stocking up with more ammunition. By the 16^th the dead were still lying around and special recovery troops had to be brought in to collect up the bodies. 5,000 were killed or wounded. The Kensingtons lost 6 officers and about 150 men. 

The thought that the war would be over by Christmas was quickly forgotten as all the troops started to settle down to make the best of it.  The glorious weather was a thing of the past too as the rain started to fall. This turned the onetime hard ground into vast areas of mud. The men were up to their knees in freezing water waiting for the next downpour. The Germans had opened-up and redirected their drainage ditches so that the water flowed down hill towards the British whose trenches soon filled up.

The trenches stretched south from Armentieres to Festubert. The countryside was flat, plain and drab, with the hillier bits of Messines Ridge and the Ypres Salient a shadow to the north. To the south ranged mounds of coal tipping around Loos and Lens. Although there were indications of places where battles had been fought the countryside had not been pulverised into a morass to be seen a few months later.

By spring 1915, the fighting began again in earnest. The 1^st Army attacked at Neuve Chapelle, a small rather insignificant village scarcely more than a cluster of scruffy cottages and barns. Three weeks later the 2^nd Army, to the north, launched an attack on a huge artificial mound that had been built up over many years of soil dug whilst constructing the railway cuttings nearby. This great mound was the southern part of the Ypres Salient, and became known as Hill 60.

This battle is significant – it staged the first large use of chlorine gas killing 6,000 French and colonial troops in ten minutes. The gas, denser than air, kept to the ground being carried by the wind. It filled the trenches and dugouts forcing the defenders to scramble out to be mown down by machine gun fire. The Germans had a victory but did not support it tactically – by not directing a follow up – before the Canadians could recover and put-in a hasty defence.

The village of St Julien lies behind Poelcappelle which is on the road to St Jean. The German advanced behind the gas storm reaching this point where they were set upon by pockets of Canadians who halted the advance sufficiently to allow the Allied line to reform. The Germans released another cloud of gas and the Canadians broke, allowing the Germans to take the village again. There followed several counterattacks by units of the Northumberland Division who lost three-quarters of their men, to no avail. The 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers continued the fight…

A German bombardment was directed at the ridge. This succeeded in shattering the 83^rd Brigade. Resuming their positions they halted the German advance by a number of desperate struggles. Eventually they gave way, pushing the defenders back. The neighbouring Brigade gave sterling support stopping the German advance. The 84^th was broken allowing a two mile gap to open up in the line. By a number of night attacks by the 10^th Brigade the line just held but the Germans were across the Menin road… In total the Germans had advanced over a mile. Now the BEF had a new commander Lt General Herbert Plumer.

There developed behind the lines a heated quarrel over the shortage of ammunition. At the Battle of Aubers Wood in the second week of May there occurred a great calamity the Army ran out of ammunition for the guns. The attack of the 15^th May on the village of Festubert was fated. Both battles were poorly conceived and executed and proved very costly in lives. British and Empire troops were forced back nearly to the gates of the city.

On the 28^th May the Battalion went into Divisional reserve. The billets at Laventie were a welcomed sight as the Battalion marched up occupying the trenches at Picantin in fine weather which made a nice change from the damp muddy quagmire they had been used to. It was late spring, the ground was hard and dry and the sun shone. The Battalion was given the task of taking the mine crater made by the Royal Engineers blowing-up the German line. The Battalion had been taken out of line especially to train for this event.

The Kensingtons moved up to the start line on the evening of the 8^th June. At 5.40 the next morning more mines were exploded and C and D Companies advanced. In spite of heavy losses they took over the main crater. A and B Companies followed along behind in support. Two hours after the start they had secured the third objectives – the crater and trench leading back to the old front line. The line was extended to Delangre Farm. The supply of bombs had now been reduced there was no sign of any back-up troops. The Brigade sent up the London Scottish in support.

By the middle of the morning only twenty-four men were standing their ground. Only one officer and two bombers arrived, an hour later the Germans had got to within ten yards and were beginning to bomb the crater. Using the ammunition from a disabled machine gun the position was temporarily saved until the machine gun ammunition began to run out. At 2.45 General Pinney passed word to retire back to the Farm. By that time No Man’s Land was swept by German fire. The casualties began to pile-up – the men used the dead to crawl round – to give them cover. Once the Farm had been reached the German gunners ranged onto it and the survivors had to retreat yet again.

By this time the Germans had surrounded the Kensingtons who had to fight their way out. Enormous bravery was shown but the day had been lost. The attempt to take Aubers Ridge failed. By nightfall fifty survivors reached Cellar Farm where they stayed until ordered to The White Cross church. A roll call found that 13 officers and 423 other ranks were lost, the Kensington Battalion becoming non-existent – as there had been no back-up reinforcements. The Battalion was taken out of the line and put to Lines of Communication duties till February 1916. The bodies of the men killed on the 9^th were never recovered.

The next attack on the British front was made by the 1^st Army at Artois. The French generals were very keen on a massive attack by the British at the same time they in the south would attack at Champagne. The French over-ruled the British generals who were not keen on the idea. Kitchener declared that the British Army should do all that it could to help the French even though it would result in heavy losses. It would also help the Russians who were in great need of urgent assistance to draw German reserves away from their front.

All had the advantage with the initial aggressor… In this instance, the Germans, they were better armed, suitably prepared – more able to dictate circumstances. Later that year, they used poison gas and flame throwers – a totally unexpected surprise element which paid off. German industrial output was fully geared to achieve maximum output for war production – particularly for munitions, something the British were to emulate.

The second attack at Aubers Ridge again demonstrated the British lack of guns and shells. Eventually this dramatic shortage was made known to those back home that caused a political storm. In May 1915, a new Ministry of Munitions was established. The British Forces increased from 35 0,000 to 800,000 by the end of the year. This increased force, Kitchener’s New Army, was engaged in training throughout the land. Now it was understood that the war was not going to be over quickly. The strictly amateurish beginning was now a professional team. The wartime facilities were upgraded to back up that new spirit of efficiency and professionalism. The new Short Lee Enfield Rifle was the best rifle that could be produced for any army. By this time recruitment had dropped alarmingly. The authorities were forced to accept that conscription was the only answer. By May the first Divisions were ready to be shipped abroad – to support the depleted BEF. The 9^th, 14^th and 15^th Divisions were marched to the Somme front, now part of the British line.

The French 10^th Army suffered over 4,000 casualties. It was a failure goading the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre to re-engage with fruitless vigour late that July. Again there was little to show for the suffering French army. By the end of 1915 they had endured nearly one and a half million casualties and the British, just under a third. In fact the French would never again reach the same willingness to fight. It became clear that France could not win and if the German army concentrated all its efforts on France, after beating the Russians, they would conquer the country. Joffre needed help and for that he turned to the British. Again it became clear that Britain had a similar problem to the French. They lacked comparable weapons and a back-up of sufficient ammunition, especially artillery shells. Kitchener recognised that the fight would have to be extended into the following year. Until both countries could work out a better solution they would have to engage in active defence in France… his eight point plan was accepted by the government.

In September a series of offensives were launched to try and punch a hole in the German lines. In the north, around Loos and Lens the British were ordered to attack whilst the French concentrated in the south, in the region of Artois. The now reorganised and revitalised British Expeditionary Force were to go into action with six-divisions amounting to 72,000 men, supported by a five-day bombardment with guns, this time, adequately supplied by munitions.

The build-up for the battle began in late August when pioneer battalions and out of line troops rebuilt, strengthened, and drained the forward, communication and reserve trenches. Other troops ferried forward supplies and ammunition. Detailed preparations took all of August. The 1^st Army had the task of being the attacking force. The ground being fought over was sprinkled with shacks, tiny hamlets, and villages… being a district of coal mines, slag heaps, pitheads… all closely linked by tracks and roads. The horizon was generally flat with gentle undulations and dips leading up to the Grenay-Hulluch ridge and Hill 70, to the east of Loos. The ridge and hill was of immense tactical value giving an excellent all round view of the area together with the various mine-shaft winding gear towers at Fosse 8 and Tower Bridge. Nothing could be hidden from the German observers…

On the 21^st of September the relative calm was shattered by an artillery bombardment of the German front line. Four days later the Battle of Loos was launched over flat, dull, open countryside – The village lay in a depression with long gentle slopes. To the east there is a low hill which was named Hill 70. Loos lies between La Bassee and the mining area around Lens. The battle raged as ten columns in extended lines, all in perfect alignment, moved forward. The German machine gunners traversed their guns backwards and forwards mowing down the lines of men – each line of a thousand men. As the wounded men struggled to rise the Germans held their fire allowing the medical teams to take the wounded back. As soon as they had done so they started to machine gun the next advancing troops.

Chapter 6. The lead up to The Somme

By the end of 1915, after the Battle of Loos, the front quietened down. It was obvious to all that although many men had died the end was still nowhere in sight. At home the country was at last waking up to the terrible conclusion that this was going to have to be outright war and everyone was going to have to contribute. Only new: tactics, weapons, and attitudes were going to win through. Gradually, as the men were enlisted – taken from the workplace, women took over their jobs. In many instances they did them better.  Women were more amenable and capable of far more intricate work where precision was required. The Kensingtons needed new replacements to make up their numbers. After receiving another batch of reinforcements from England they were back up to strength. A new training schedule was devised to make the Division ready for front line fighting. This was neither the first time the battalion was reinforced nor, as it turned out, it’s last. The reformed brigade marched off to Loos station and there entrained for Pont Remy. Arriving in pouring rain the brigade marched off again to Citerne. This village set in undulating countryside with few cottages or hamlets was rural in the extreme. The weather was squally with occasional heavy falls of snow. Again, the brigade was housed in bell tents in a muddy field. The next day they engaged in strenuous training exercises using the latest tactics and weapons. The automatic Lewis gun with its pan of bullets was going to be an improvement, so too the new grenades and Stokes mortar. Every day groups were detailed off to become experts in the use of these weapons, whilst wearing the new style gas mask. Route and speed marches, in full fighting order, were made at least once a week; distances over twenty-five miles soon led to men dropping out, to be picked up later by wagon. At last, the division set off away from Citerne to Longpre – a large farm complex. By the time the battalion got to Longpre many men were complaining about blisters. They had short shrift from the sergeants who told them that it was an offence to have blisters and any more complaints then the malingerers would receive punishment for not taking due care. This soon settles everyone down. Guards were detailed off and the rest collapsed utterly exhausted. There were no blankets or food until the following day. The roads were congested by marching Frenchmen, and wheeled artillery… All racing to get to Verdun. Their movement delayed the battalion from continuing – so they had a forced couple of days of rest, interspersed with whatever practices the sergeants could think up – to keep them occupied. The rolling hills and shallow valleys gave Picardy an appearance of Salisbury Plain. Compared to Ypres it had space, unobstructed views, and open countryside, suitable for unrestricted action. Those of a more frivolous nature described it as a good hunting country. The region’s ground surface was above layers of chalk, an ideal structure to construct deep shelters and communicating trenches. The Germans were experts at making the most of their front line putting all their ingenuity into making substantial living accommodation to back up the forward troops. Both sides dug like mad to make extensive trench systems. Once again, the objective was to take the strain off the French who were suffering many casualties at Verdun. In February 1916, when Joffre intended to offer up an offensive riposte to areas north and south of the Somme he passed over the French Tenth Army’s front to the British. By spring 1916, Allenby’s Third Army held the land to the north of Hebuterne and the Fourth Army land to the south; this area of combat was changed after the second day of the battle to call The Reserve Army. The Fourth Army Sector was concentrated further south – on Becourt. The French had been the temporary custodians of Foncquevillers and Hebuterne. This was French land and they wanted the invaders out… This attitude describes the psychological moment: the British wanted to get the war over, and return home, the French wanted their usurped land back… both wanted movement not static defence. The Germans had taken the land – its resources and industry, and had for the moment other fish to fry – they were also fighting the Italians and the Russians, and not in a hurry to move… In which case they thought, why not make the station comfortable and secure? The German command had to instil discipline and order, to make their men happy. They set the men to work to make the line impregnable… letting the local commanders devise the best ways – to make their front efficient and militarily daunting to the enemy. There is no better way for a leader to get cooperation from the men than to give them a chance to make their life more comfortable. The German trenches were in many cases fifteen feet deep, with dormitories, cook-houses, latrines and wash areas, stores, and armouries – all cut or buried into the ground, boarded and propped. Stairs, companionways, with reinforced head cover; wattle and board trench sides and raised duck-boards. Gun positions, machine gun nests, trench mortar pits, pill boxes, sentry boxes, observation and periscope sites, all frequently constructed using concrete. The trench system was linked to communication trenches running back to their rear lines, with tunnels leading to vital sectors many lit by electricity and the sides taking telephone wires. Isolated hamlets, villages and factories, bisected by the front line, adapted and converted into fortified positions – as forts along the wall. The German artillery and machine guns were laid and registered onto key British positions with the distances, indicated by marker stakes. This preparation allowed for immediate firing; each gun capable of overlapping lanes of fire with their next along the trench – to cover the open ground ahead, and where possible enfilade on either flank. All along the front banks of staked barbed wire many yards thick ran out into no-man’s-land. It was these well-constructed trenches that the first then the second wave had to suppress, navigate, and pass through, allowing the third wave to clear – by bombing and take prisoners. Further waves brought along spare ammunition and grenades and later waves got down into the trench to reverse the firing step and opened up access points, clearing blocked intersections and shell damage. Finally the stretcher bearers attended to the wounded and the dead. All this had to be negotiated and made secure before a break-out could attack the enemy rear. All this was to come if all went well. During early May the 46^th Division was out-of-line resting in their billet at Lucheux. After the mud, cold, and wet of Vimy, they appreciated the better weather, the good billets and the excellent country in which they now found themselves. The Château de Lucheux and the gateway, stands on the edge of a forest a few miles north of Doullens. As in all out-of-line camps fatigues were carried on, in this case, the men made revetments – to line trench sides. The 56^th Division marched to Souastre continuing their training much as the 46^th were doing at Lucheux. A fortnight later they set off again, to march to Hebuterne, whilst the 46^th occupied their billets at Foncquevillers. Both these villages held old French lines prepared in 1914. The sixteen or so miles both Divisions had to make were completed in the morning. Divisional Headquarters allowed them two days’ rest: exploring their local villages, doing some washing, and having a canvas bath. Shouldering their rifles, they formed up again, to march onto Magnicourt. There they continued practicing attacks and had further instruction of bombing, and another exhibition of the German flamethrower, being told its uses and problems. The Generals were continually thinking of ways to keep the men occupied to prevent boredom and slack ways. The Germans had launched a massive attack on the French Line at Verdun on 21st February 1916, and the battle was still raging, the French had lost almost half a million men. To alleviate the strain on the French it was decided that the British should make a strong attack on the Somme. Although the battle has been given the name of the Somme it was in fact the Battle of Ancre – another river, more central to the action. This battle was not planned in isolation. The policy was to keep pressing the Germans on all fronts, in unison, which included the Italian and Russian fronts. All units had to send in night attacks to take prisoners and extract information about the opposing formations. The main battle front lay between Gommecourt to the north and Maricourt in the south. On the north of Ancre lay the village of Beaumont Hamel and Serre four miles south of Gommecourt. The Somme is the name for a French administrative department – a Province, taken from the name of the river, which runs through the region. The part held by the British was the northeast corner overlapping into the next department, the Pas de Calais. This region of France formed part of the old province of Picardy; an old Roman road linked its cathedral city Amiens and two smaller towns of Albert, northeast of Amiens, and further still Bapaume. The region was crossed by two rivers the Somme and the smaller Ancre. The Germans were defending their gains. The Allies, intent upon pushing them back. The former, constructed deep secure trenches and dugouts whilst developing small villages into miniature forts. The latter believed such tactics created a ‘Sit it out’ attitude. The British high command trusted mobility and attack. What was typical, the Germans always seemed to hold the high ground; not only could they observe what was going on, but knew that any attack had to be made uphill! They were more interested in securing a defensible position than more land. If this suggests that their leaders were more able, militaristic, and forward thinking, perhaps they were. What was true is that they were on somebody else’s land and their supplies came by road not by sea. As the advantage in war always favoured the attackers the Germans held the stronger position. Both sides were at this time depending on attrition – pounding their opponents into the ground. Not very subtle but the victor would be he who could sustain it longest. Putting in attacks that held no chance of being sustained, or, planned to end the campaign, was wasteful. The battle of the Somme is a case in point. It was never envisaged that it would finish the war and it certainly never had sufficient resources. The result was stalemate. Both sides were soaked in blood and worn out – for it all had to be gone through again! Did the powers that be ever learn any lessons? I am not sure they did and the age of the tank and American intervention was to come.

The Somme

This was going to be a hard nut to crack. When General Haig planned this battle he wondered how he could give the attack a better chance! Whilst he considered this he told the commanders of his First, Second, and Third Armies to carry out constant threatening moves – to keep the German troops on their toes. Like all good commanders he consulted his Intelligence section and took soundings from his staff. He came up with a diversionary movement. This was not a new idea as all commanders considered one, placing them at a distance from the main attack – the flanks being an ideal place. On Haig’s left was a salient sticking out of the German line. This was a continuing sore which would be the perfect place. Gommecourt, for that was the name of the salient would be ideal. As he could not take any forces away from General Rawlinson he contacted General Allenby – Commander of his Third Army – to request a corps transfer. Allenby chose the 46^th and 56^th Territorial Divisions. Their task was to mount a full-scale attack on Gommecourt. The object: remove the salient if possible, but more importantly, cause a diversion – to stop German reinforcements backing up their troops opposite the main British thrust – which was to be an advance up the main road from Albert towards Bapaume. This main force was Lt-General Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, backed up and supported by Lt-General Gough’s Reserve Army, who were hoping to break out – into the country beyond. Neither Allenby nor Rawlinson liked the plan because there was a gap between their Army and Rawlinson’s Fourth – leaving no protection to the right flank of the attacking force – between Gommecourt and Serre – the preserves of Hunter Western’ 8^th Corps.  Behind Gommecourt – to the north, was the Quadrilateral, a defensive position surrounded by tracks. Southwest lay the village: the high street, crossroads, chateau, park, wood, orchards, and cemetery. By the time of the battle there were three lines of German trenches and interlocking communication trenches, plus their dug-outs and fortified posts. The whole lot constituted The Kern Redoubt. From the centre of the main British attack at Albert, Gommecourt is some ten miles to the north. All the villages, through which the German front line ran, were turned into fortified strong-points. The Kern Redoubt was one, if not the main defence system in the line and as such was going to be an extremely hard nut to crack. This was not obvious to the casual observer, for all the main troop locations were underground with passageways leading to specific locations and key outer defences. The machine gun nests were camouflaged; some with top cover others in strategic positions dictated by the attackers approach. The German defending artillery was used for counter battery and bombardment and was hidden by a number of woods. In front of the firing line was staked barbed wire strung to a minimum depth of ten feet. Both the little Z – a zig-zag on the eastern flank, and the Z just before the village – a finger of park jutting out on the centre, allowed machine gun fire to enfilade the Sherwood’s attacking the wood. Lieutenant General Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow KCB, KCMG was born in Newton Valence. He attended Eton and St John’s College, Oxford, obtaining a commission in 1879. Promoted Captain 1887, took part in the wars in Africa reaching staff rank in 1897. At the outbreak of the 1st World War he commanded the 4th Division finally becoming commander VII Corps on 15th July 1915. His force at Gommecourt comprised the 46^th North Midland and 56^th London Divisions. It was Snow’s plan and his alone, to create a pincer movement around the strongly held Gommecourt Park – the tip of the German salient. He had however, no freedom of action – about the numbers of artillery pieces he could muster, the type, or numbers of shells allowed for each gun, or the timing of his attack… for these had to conform to the main battle plan devised by his senior commander – General Rawlinson. The division’s main aim was to draw German attention away from the main battle area – keep him occupied. Whereas, Snow’s plan smacks of ‘a positive aggressive action’ – to encircle, crush, and take. If he had planned a single push using all his forces, on the weakest part of the German front line – somewhere where they could not be shot at by machine gun fire, whilst making his flanks secure his action would have had – a far greater effect. A narrow front allowed a greater concentration of fire – on batteries on the front and in the rear. The then current General Staff instructions were: that no attack should be made: when having to advance more than 200 yards from the enemy. Snow stressed before the battle – to his two divisional commanders: ‘this is a diversion to support the main battle, your role is a strictly limited one; there are no reserves, and your attack should only take place when the German defences have been destroyed by the artillery’. These limiting factors are restrictive and important guidelines. They indicate that there was no strategic point in the attack, and that success depended on a single outcome – the full engagement and occupation of the Germans. During the attack all Rawlinson’s limiters would need verification – checked by a trustworthy officer who would then report back. Presumably General Rawlinson received this? There are no references to an on the spot examination, nor who was to make the decision, or by what means the information was to be carried back to those in charge. Only the commanding officer at the front can decide if the German defences have been destroyed sufficiently to be sure any attack would be successful. If he cannot be certain by personal knowledge he needs good, reliable information passed to him. On the day neither of these instructions were carried out. Within the first few minutes it was clear the German defences had not been destroyed and within the first two hours it was clear that there was a disaster in the making. Opposing his men, General Fritz von Belows 2nd Guards Reserve Infantry Division (3 Corps = 15,000 strong), formed in August 1914 from non-Guards reservists from Westphalia, Hanover, and smaller German states adjoining Prussian provinces. They included artillery, cavalry and engineers. The Division was made up of the 26th Reserve Infantry Brigade, the 15th & 55th Regiments: and the 38th Reserve Infantry Brigade, the 77th & 91st. From spring until late June 1916, there was feverish activity along the whole Allied front which was gaining momentum. It was obvious to all, particularly the Germans, that there was going to be an attack. This was even more evident to the German 2nd Reserve Division Reserve Regiments; all were purposely allowed to see preparation taking place. This was part of the ruse to draw attention away from the main British attack. General Haig’s plan was to create a series of faints along the whole front – and to make them obvious. This order was carried out to the letter – all preparations were made openly. In May, von below was informed by his Operations Branch that, ‘air surveys had reported the construction of a broad-gauge railway, new highways, and gun positions.’ Falkenhayn ordered his pioneers to construct a third line of defences – to give extra retiring positions. A detachment of 8″ howitzers was transferred, made up of captured Russian guns. However, Falkenhayn believed the British will only pin down the front – not make a serious attempt at Gommecourt.

Chapter 7. General Fritz Von

However, by 1st June, Below worked out by evidence that the British were going to attack Gommecourt and he ordered his men to be watchful. Practices were carried out to see how long it would take from a warning to get men up from the deep dug-outs, assemble their machine guns, and start firing – the eventual target was three minutes. Fritz von below and Prince Rupprecht were right, expecting the Gommecourt Salient would be one of the main targets. Falkenhayn thought the British attack would be further north and refused to send extra troops. At the start of the battle the Germans were outnumbered seven to one. Lt-General Snow told General Haig,’ they know we’re coming alright.’ Von Below reinforced the Gommecourt Sector with the 2nd Guard Reserve in the middle of June and later with the 170th. Reserve Regiment. The 2nd Guards Reserve Division was commanded by General Freiherr von Susskind which was part of General Stein’s 14^th Reserve Corps. The German saviours of the salient were: the 15^th, 55^th, 77^th, and 170^th Regiments. All these German units had, at full-strength, a composite of 800 men in nine battalions. This was approximately half that of the British. The main difference between the two armies was: in training, the number of machine guns, artillery support, and provision of appropriate ammunition. Originally there were two German Regiments and their artillery holding the salient. This was increased to four with a number in support. The two new regiments brought with them their artillery to add to the 19th and 20th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment’s fifty plus – which were already positioned there. A number of heavy howitzer batteries were included. All these guns could reach the 7th and 8th Corps troops stationed opposite Serre, Beaumont Hamel, and Gommecourt right flank. Behind the 56th Division was the beautiful village of Hebuterne. The capital of the area was Amiens where the cathedral declared the region’s religious obedience. The land was described as chalk-land. Hebuterne was one of the area’s largest towns. A few cottages lined the road with tall stately trees behind which lay orchards and gardens. Amongst these trees the French, the previous occupants, had constructed a number of trenches. The place was typical of the region. All the buildings were built of red sand brick except the church which was of imported stone. The main employer in the village had been the owner of the brick built mill. Its ruins and cellars now formed the battalion headquarters with all the usual staff: the Adjutant, Regimental Sergeant Major, clerks, runners, signallers, and cooks etc. – the entrances protected by sandbagged abutments. The French had also constructed trenches on the eastern side of the village closest to Gommecourt Wood using a number of interconnecting communication trenches to give access for supply teams during the hours of darkness. Nearby was a bunker known as The Keep? The village nestles between the British 3rd and 4th Armies, opposite the salient village of Gommecourt: its chateau, park, wood, famous tree – the Kaiser Oak, and crossroads. In parts of the front line, the German trenches were only fifty feet away with a hedge in between. The Germans could be heard talking to each other. By the time the British occupied their front line in 1916 Hebuterne was deserted – a ghost-town – a shadow of its former past, for it was in ruins. Even though the village and church had suffered terribly the tower still stood proudly silhouetted against the sky. As with all points of interest the Germans had the church entrance well within their artillery range – and zeroed-in – even though the entrance had been sandbagged – it was a dangerous place to linger, by standing at the Hebuterne crossroads – looking a mile north, you see the village of Gommecourt with its Cemetery and Park. Between Hebuterne and Gommecourt grew a hedge, interspersed with a few trees which lay in a coombe, a slight valley at an angle to the rise. This is where an advanced trench was to be prepared. The attack at the Gommecourt salient was to be a diversionary one – to delay or stop German reinforcements backing up their troops being made by the main British thrust up the road – the main supply route from Albert towards Bapaume. This Big Push was to be made by the British Fourth Army led by General Rawlinson backed up and supported by the Reserve Army of Sir Herbert Gough, whom it was hoped would exploit the penetration by creating a rout in the German rear. From the centre of the main British attack Gommecourt is some ten miles north. The salient sticks out into the British sector was an eye catching bulge, you couldn’t help but be drawn to it! Gommecourt is on a slight rise, dominating the countryside around. The trees in the park had been stripped of their foliage by shellfire making the place ghostly – possessed by evil. It is the village, Park and Cemetery which are contained within the Kern Redoubt whose administration centre was the Quadrilateral, a fortified box – formed by tracks on all sides. The German front line trench outlines the geographical spur and the village complex. Behind the line is the D6 road from Foncquevillers south to Serre. The coombe between the two chalk banks held No Man’s Land. The Crucifix on the British front line stood on the shoulder of the valley. As with all German held villages situated on their front line, the buildings became fortified strong-points making this a very strong fortified position. In front of the German trench line runs barbed wire strung on iron stakes in a series of rows, the wire made the position impregnable. The German Front Line trench was serviced with support and guard lines all linked to the communication trenches which stretched back to the central fortress. The German Front Line was a deep trench well revetted bearing a parapet. It was dug twelve to fifteen feet deep and shored up at intervals with timbering and wicker-work. Along its length it was further strengthened by reinforced bomb proof shelters. Cut into the rear of the German trench were deep dugouts, some served with their own periscopes on a tripod. It was the job of the observation squads to inform their colleagues if an attack was being made. A number of tunnels and cuttings lead back to the new third trench… one in particular led back from the Z on D6 road – the Staffordshire’s front which was to be such an important contribution to the German counter attack. When the alarm was raised, by the German observers, their shout triggered a timed response of three minutes. Their machine-gun teams assembled their weapon for rapid fire. It was these machine-gun teams and supporting artillery that were the chief danger to both advancing Divisions. They were placed where they would do most damage, having a clear field of fire each situated where they could enfilade the area to their front. The German artillery parks, of all calibres, were hidden in the woods behind Gommecourt. They were of equal, if not superior in number, to their British counterparts. Forming the hub of all this was the command centre at the Quadrilateral. The whole salient dented the British Sector. The Germans had the time and the inclination to make themselves as comfortable and as impregnable as possible. The German 170th Reserve defended this fort. They wanted to survive and to see another day! Part of the German defences was to set up their machine guns so that they could sweep their front and cross over and cover the next gun along the line. At night each gun was set up on fixed lines to cover a particular weak spot or gap in the wire. The gun could be discharged at irregular moments throughout the night dissuading nightly patrols, capture and repair parties against the Germans were pitted the 46th and 56th Divisions. They were going to be asked to walk across No Man’s Land, in line, evenly spaced out, whilst trying not to bunch up, or take shelter. If they could keep pace with the advancing barrage they were assured the Germans were not going to stand up on their firing steps but were going to keep their heads down. This creeping barrage was there to force the enemy to keep below their parapet. As there had been an almost continuous gunfire for the previous week – planned to destroy the banks of staked barbed wire and gun nests, taking the Redoubt was not going to present a problem. This was the considered belief at British Headquarters. Others less knowledgeable thought this show was going to be a walk over.’ Two days before the attack patrols reported that there were great gaps in the German wire and some of the German positions vacated. On the 46th Division’s front patrols reported there were no gaps, and that there was a large unreported hollow in the ground that was filled with half buried wire. The weather was squally with occasional heavy falls of snow. Again, the brigade was housed in bell tents in a muddy field. The next day they engaged in strenuous training exercises using the latest tactics and weapons. The automatic Lewis gun with its pan of bullets was going to be an improvement, so too the new grenades. Every day groups were detailed off to become experts in the use of these weapons, including using them whilst wearing the new style gas mask. Route and forced marches, in full fighting kit, were made at least once a week. Both these marches were over twenty-five miles in length. This soon led to men dropping out, to be picked up by wagon. At last, the Division set off away from Citerne to Longpre – a large farm complex. In October 1915, the battalion casualties had been so bad that the Kensingtons and Irish Rangers had amalgamated. During three months in early 1916 when replacements became available – from training battalions in Britain, they were shipped over to fill up the places, allowing both battalions to reform.  Both were now in training at Halloy which gave the replacement troops time to become familiar with the old salts, and for them all to become proficient with the new Lewis machine gun and Stokes mortar. Particular emphasis was laid on their bayoneting skills. Lectures and demonstrations were laid on to re-introduce the skills necessary. Steadily, as each company became proficient, they took over the Hebuterne sector, on the left of the Somme front – opposite Gommecourt. A close study of the Somme battles and particularly the attack at Gommecourt, although a subsidiary, gives a picture of the thinking processes of those engaged in organising and conducting warfare at that time. A great deal of confidence was shown towards what was expected by the various artillery pieces and their ammunition.  Time and again in both world wars it was proved that the artillery did not achieve what was expected… even if great care is taken by sighting and laying the guns. It needs a spotter’s identification to register a correct fall of shot before trying another and even then you do not know the actual result. To fire a gun half a mile away from the target so that the shot falls into a trench three feet wide needs many attempts. The shell must be fused to ensure it explodes before being buried in the mud, or just at the lip of the trench – to achieve maximum devastation. To take out a machine gun nest built three sandbags high to give cover to the height of a crouching man sitting on the ground in a five foot pit in circumference is a challenge. The trench had to be large enough to accommodate his number two, spare ammunition and cooling tank and all covered with a shrapnel proof roof of turf that protects and camouflages the nest. The Germans were purposely forewarned about the attack but not the timing. At the start of the barrage they had either dropped below the parapet, into a twelve foot deep dugout, or retired back to a rear trench. They had practised many times to get to their weapon pits, erect their guns, and stand too in three minutes. Staked banks of coiled barbed wire even if subjected to exploding shrapnel is not always severed, and even if it is, it doesn’t just fall to the ground in neat pieces, but resumes its coil – tends to spring back. To rely upon it being passable when so much is at stake, and not make any proper verification, is foolhardy. Until the following year when more tanks appeared the wire was going to continue to be one of the great hazards for the battle planners. As soon as the enemy saw an effort was actively being made to cut, blow up, or tow away their wire they knew an attack was imminent. General Rawlinson’s Wave System involved an advance behind a rolling barrage. This creeping barrage was laid down one hundred yards in front of the leading wave – usually ‘A’ Company – of the advancing battalion. They would fall-in on the trench parapet and face the enemy. Each man was to be dressed five yards apart, one hundred yards between waves, with their arms at the port. Their advance was to be slow and deliberate no faster than two miles per hour. There was to be no stopping for any reason, maintaining the correct distance behind the barrage. The battalion would take nine minutes to pass a given point covering an area 400×900 yards. It is obvious that any enemy machine gun still operating would lay havoc – as it did for the Sherwood Foresters first waves, advancing towards the Quadrilateral; likewise the German artillery barrage from behind Serre, ranging in on the Kensingtons, who were about to dig the communication trench – to their front – in no-man’s-land. The troops engaged in the attack on the Kern Redoubt were mainly those of the Infantry. The basic weapon in 1916 was the Short Magazine Lee Enfield Mark III, made at the Enfield Manufacturing Co Ltd. It was designed by the American James Lee and built at the Royal Small Arms Factory in Enfield, first produced in 1903. It had a ten-bullet magazine and a high rate of fire. There has been much written about its quality – in comparison with the German Mauser. As the same design was used for over fifty years of manufacture it speaks for itself, as to its usefulness and reliability. It was a most excellent rifle and served the Country and Commonwealth with distinction, could be used in rapid fire – firing over twenty rounds a minute. The short Lee Enfield went out of use during the Malayan War in 1948-1960. The Webley revolver at the outbreak of the First World War was the Mk V adopted in December 1913. On 24 May 1915, the Webley Mk VI was adopted as the standard sidearm for British troops and remained so for the duration of the First World War, being issued to officers, airmen, naval crews, boarding parties, trench raiders, machine-gun teams, and tank crews. The Mk VI side-arm proved to be a very reliable and hardy weapon, well suited to the mud and adverse conditions of trench warfare.  A development of the Maxim gun had been in service with the British Army since the turn of the nineteenth century. The gun was water-cooled and fed by a canvas belt holding 250 rounds. The gun was served by a team of nine usually an officer, two NCOs and six other ranks. All ranks were expected to take each other’s jobs in an emergency. During the attack on the Redoubt a number of these guns were taken over and used against the German lines. Their use was mainly restricted to protecting the right flank or when men were falling back when the attack petered out. Any other firings had the possibility of becoming friendly fire. Once again a weapon devised in the USA, in 1911. Air-cooled with a rotating magazine fitted on the top. Lighter, cheaper and simpler to manufacture. Became standard British close support, automatic weapon. A hand-held bomb, invented in 1915, by William Mills. It was a hand thrown cast iron fragmentation bomb with delayed action fuse weighing 1.5 lbs. with firing lever release pin… Have a thirty yard range, and a possible ten yard killing zone. Bombing parties were formed to clear a trench, its traverse, and mined dugouts. In normal fighting the Mills grenade is used for house and pill-box clearances. Sir William Scott-Stokes was a civil engineer by trade: Chairman and Managing Director of Ransomes & Rapier of Ipswich. Invented the trench mortar in 1914 made ready to use at Loos firing smoke canisters. The invention, using a cartridge fired by a raised pin, could be adapted to fire fragmentation and solid shot up to 800 yards. Over time, having many modifications became: extremely versatile, simple to use, quickly set up, and very portable. It was quickly realised that this was the only way to effectively clear a path in barbed wire defences. The tube could be loaded with gun cotton or dynamite sticks and several lengths of the tube could be joined together depending on the width of the barbed wire entanglement. The firing element consisted of a fuse and safety pin setting off the charge in tandem. The object was to thread the tube through the wire not pushed along the ground. It was the job of the Royal Engineer detachments to make those breaks in the wire. The final bombardment started at 06.00 on the 1st July. The gunners had saved up for this occasion. It was the greatest bombardment ever laid on, and it went on all along the front. The ferocity lasted an hour before the leading formations rose-up out of their trenches. The ground shook, earth crumbled split apart and cascaded down the sides of the trenches – it was teeth clenching and alarming. Fountains of mud, dust, smoke and debris shot into the air. For anyone brave or stupid enough to look over the parapet they would only see Dante’s Inferno and hear the crump, whistle, whine and shriek of metal particles whizzing through the air. The British gunners did try and focus their weapons on particular targets. They were as inexperienced to their task as the infantry were to theirs. They were certainly not the highly trained men of the French School of applied artillery and engineering in Fontainebleau. Great attention was paid to bombarding known strong points: in the Park, centre of the village, the Maze of trenches the London Scottish were going to pass through, Nameless Farm, and the little and large Z points in the line that could enfilade the 46^th Division’s advance. Further north was Pigeon Farm, another German strong point. The Field Siege Guns and Howitzers were under the Royal Artillery command of Brigadier General C. M. Ross-Johnson.  The Heavy Artillery controlled by Brigadier General C. R. Buckle, and the Chief Engineer was Brigadier General J. A. Tanner. These leaders believed they could do all that was asked of them. The British guns at the Somme fired some 20,000 tons of various size shells, a total of 1,627,824 individual shells, according to Official History – but it was the wrong sort of shell. It requires high-explosives to damage trenches and the British did not have enough. Three-quarters of all the shells fired were shrapnel, useless for affecting anything that was well covered, or for cutting barbed wire. Considerable quantities were dud. Mud, and there was a lot of it on the front, absorbs and cushions the metal particles. The harder the surface the more effective the fragmentation – when the shell explodes, whatever the type of shell. A great many shells were dud or did not explode. The effectiveness is reliant upon perfect manufacture of the explosive charge, the correct amount of explosive material placed in every shell and the weight of each shot being precisely the same. It was early on in the war. The Army was still operating on a pre-war mind-set. Such things as conveyor-belt manufacturing, studied chemical composition, ballistics, distances, angles, mathematics, and mapping points, not greatly studied by the regulars let alone the Territorial Units. Intelligence gathering, ciphers, information sifting, gun emplacement recognition, photographic evidence, sound location, aerial spotting, were primitive. The communication methods were almost ineffectual especially once the battle had begun. All these are necessary for accurate gun laying, firing, observation, and achieving scored hits working under the command of forward observation posts, in contact with the advancing troops. Indirect fire could be done off the map but the maps in France were not good: and at the start of the war not squared or gridded. Various other methods were used adopting aiming posts or triangulation. Fire was corrected by observation, needed because the battery observer and target were not accurately fixed.  Errors in range were not very significant due to the range zone of the gun but error in line meant always missing the target. The Royal Flying Corps was commanded by a former Lieutenant-Colonel of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, H. M. Trenchard. The Royal Flying Corps had two categories: spotting for the artillery, photography, and reconnaissance; bombing, and fighting in the air. Before, and during the battles that encapsulated the battle of the Somme, close cooperation between the Flying Corps and the gunners was paramount. Special flights were made that involved artillery observation specifically to reduce the opposing guns. The relatively new craft of air photography became an exact science. Bombing too began to be taken seriously and became highly organized; night flights for particular targets – those greatly defended by small arms, became a serious occupation… Number 43 Squadron being the first long-range strategically reconnaissance squadron engaged in assessing military build-up in the enemy rear.

Chapter 8. The Battle of Loos

The first action the 46^th North Midland Division was engaged in was at The Battle of Loos when they attacked the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This was another of the strongly held fortified villages along the front. The 46^th had been the first territorial Division to land in France and it was from the Lancashire Fusiliers that they were instructed in the art of trench warfare. On 1st June 1914, Major General Wortley became commander of the British 46^th North Midland Division. The Division was part of General Allenby’s Third Army. On 20^th April 1916 the Division was withdrawn from Vimy and ordered south. By May they were at Lucheux recuperating after the battle’s horrors. The 46th Division were billeted in Foncquevillers andcommanded by Major General Hon. E. J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley. They were attached to Lt-General D’Oyly Snow’s VII Corps. His Corps was part of the Third Army, whose General Office Commanding was Gen Allenby. The Division incorporated the North Midland Division, who were to attack the north side of the fortified village of Gommecourt – on the left flank on the British Line. The Division was made up of three brigades. As the Division began to gather together at Lucheux they were ordered to practise their bayoneting skills whilst acting in a variety of servicing and communication skills building pipelines, laying track, building roads, trenches and gun pits. This was preparing for The Big Push. They were now attached to General Rawlinson’s Fourth Army. Their task was to help liberate the Gommecourt salient by linking up with the 56^th coming towards them from the other side of Gommecourt Park.  While the Staffs and Sherwoods had been practising for the attack on the 1^st July the Lincoln and Leicestershire battalions were occupying the British Front Line before Gommecourt Park and Wood. There, on the 4^th June they patrolled at night, and improved the trench conditions, which were suffering under the continuous downpours of rain. Whilst they were there they were told they were to be attached to the 46^th Division. It was during the practices – simulating the attack on Gommecourt, that the battalion commanders came to the conclusion that they could not manage all that they were being asked. They appealed to General Snow who agreed to loan them the Lincoln and Leicester battalions who were to provide three companies from each to line up behind the Staffords and Sherwood Foresters bearing extra stores and ammunition. The fourth company (400 men) were to dig a communication trench stretching from the British front line to the German – across no-man’s-land, to aid supply and keep safe from shelling men acting as reserves. On the 24^th June the British artillery started to zero in on the German gun parks to the rear of Gommecourt – hidden in Pigeon, Biez, Square, and Rossignol Woods. These shots were meant to register the guns onto the targets. Unfortunately it requires accurate bracketing shots to be sure when the time comes those targets would be hit. The gun barrels and any rifling has to be new, the shells have to fit accurately and have exactly the same amount of propellant, the gun trail has to be properly secured and the ground under the wheels firm. The Observation Sections, whose job it was to register the fall of shot were responsible for maps, flash spotting, and sound ranging. Considering all these factors you would not want to rely upon the artillery taking out the opposing guns. Unfortunately that is exactly what General Rawlinson did. It was only the previous October that counter-battery work was to be left to the heavy artillery and a special officer, with the necessary assistants, attached to each Group Commander. By July 1916 the system was still in its infancy. Surveyors were organised into Field Survey Companies, Royal Engineers; one per Army… each Army had an Observation section for flash spotting and a Sound Ranging section. At the battle of the Somme information was passed via telephone exchanges. These however, were frequently destroyed. On the night of the 27^th June, the area suffered 48 hours of continual rain. The Staffords and Sherwoods filed into the forward trench early the next morning, where they tramped knee deep in mud and slime. The battlefield before them was a quagmire with shell holes filled with water. It was a most depressing sight. It was obvious that the attack would flounder especially as the men had to carry such a vast amount of extra material. At the last minute the attack was put back 48 hours to the 1^st July. Now the men in the front line trenches had to be withdrawn to allow them to dry out and rest. For the Sherwoods and Staffords they had to return to Lucheux to demonstrate before General Snow a practice run. At 06.24 on the 1^st July, the final shells were sent over using high explosive and smoke. Trench mortars provided more accurate distribution of smoke bombs. Few doubted the Germans had been destroyed; the bombardment had been a moral boost. At 07.27 the Sherwood Foresters discharged the final rounds of smoke into no-man’s-land. At 07.30 the Staffordshires and Sherwood Foresters climbed out of their new forward trench – using ladders or steps cut into the trench sides. Their Sergeants, helping to pull the men out, under the watchful eyes of the Captain and his Lieutenants, who would themselves fall in behind their own companies, closely accompanied by the Company Runner and Engineer/Signaller next to the Captain. All the ‘A’ Companies of each battalion would line up on their parapet, dressing five yards between each man. They would advance side-by-side until they had reached one hundred yards. The first three waves would total 600 -700 men. The day was bright and clear. They moved off at a steady pace with their rifles at the port, bayonet in the air. Behind them further waves lined up and followed them. There was no shouting or light banter; they were all too nervous wondering what was going to happen to them. The Sergeants as much to bolster their own courage told them to keep in line and not bunch up… but the ground was pitted with holes half full of water there was no way they could keep a perfect line. The Sherwoods passed over the German front line and disappeared into the woods…When the time came round the ‘B’ Companies would climb out and do the self-same thing… each company, battalion, and supporting battalion, following one-behind-the-other, keeping to a steady 2 miles per hour pace so that the artillery bombardment – put on to keep the German heads down, would be 100 yards in front of the first wave. Each man would be carrying his battle order kit, spare pair of socks and extra ammunition. Later waves would bring forward duck boards to span the German trenches, ladders to reach down to the bottom, spare ammunition and grenades, and digging tools. So far everything was going well. The first two waves had got across, and there was no reply by the enemy, they were soon lost from sight. Suddenly one felt the wind freshen, it sent a shiver down the spine, as the smoke swirled about and then began to clear. Now the whole panorama presented itself to the German Observers.

Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Young assumed command of the Kensington Battalion on the 28th June 1916, just two days before the attack at Gommecourt. Major Cedric Dickens the second in command… having been with the battalion since entering France had a greater understanding of the officers and men. The 56th London Division was probably the most highly trained territorial division in the British Army. Its four component parts had seen a lot of action, already losing few men but maintaining a high proportion of their original pre-war volunteers. The men were mainly well educated, working as managers and office workers in London’s business sector.  The Kensingtons formed part of the 56th London Division in January 1916, after the war office authorised its re-formation. By the end of the following month the 56^th Division’s composition was complete, being joined by the 1^st Battalion Cheshire Regiment as their Pioneers and the 1^st Field Ambulance Section – ready for the battle of the Somme. Major-General Hull based his plans for the attack on Gommecourt, on orders given to him by General Snow. Snow conformed to decisions made by Lt-General Rawlinson, in overall command. Snow’s brief was to create a diversion at the salient to draw German attention away from the main battle area. He was also told there were no reserves and no troops set aside to take advantage of any gains made. General Snow, conceding that the German defences were strong, decided to plan an encircling movement – to attack from the flanks. Concerned about the distance between the two front lines a plan was put into effect to dig two new trenches in No Man’s Land before both Battalions’ Sectors. On the 56^th Division’s front the task was given to Brig-General Loch. When the trench had been completed, his orders were to keep it occupied with his 167th Brigade which was made up of two battalions of Royal Fusiliers and two of the Middlesex, until the attacking troops took over prior to the battle. Hull was in command of the 56th 1st London Division and the attached pioneer battalion the 1st Cheshires – occupying the British sector south of Gommecourt. This was the right arm of the pincer movement surrounding the park and village. They were to meet up with the 46th North Midland Division coming towards them from the north side, led by Major General Wortley. This assumption of success was handed down from General Headquarters and was widely believed by all senior commanders. It was a confidence which was misplaced, but dominated every facet of the battle’s planning. The reader will become aware that the orders of battle – the tasks set for the 46^th and 56^th Division, were almost identical. There were only one or two changes, to do with their positions on the battlefield that were different… but in effect were the same. They were facing the same enemy, using the same tactics, using the same weapons. The distances were approximately the same, as indeed the goal. The 56th London Division, commanded by Major General C. P. A. Hull: Included the 167th Brigade – made up by the 1st Royal Fusiliers, the 7th Middlesex, the 3rd Royal Fusiliers and the 8th Middlesex. The 168th Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Loch with Brigade Major Captain Neame and Staff Captain Major Wheatley had as their battalions: the 4th Royal Fusiliers, the 13th Kensingtons, commanded by Lt-Col. Young, the 12th London Rangers and the 14th London Scottish. The169th Brigade: contained the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 9th Queen Victoria Rifles, the 5th London Rifles, and finally the 16th Queen’s Westminster’s. As their Field Engineers they had the 5th Cheshire Pioneers commanded by Lt. Col. Groves. Major General Hull’s plan: at zero hour, had the 1st London Rifle Battalion – Royal Fusiliers, commanded by Lt. Col. Wheatley: to advance from Y48 trench, take the German Fen and Ferret trenches… pass on to take Female trench… bear left at the Cemetery setting up two strong points either end > split: one Section to enter the Park – take the Germans in the rear… then set up a strong point at the southern edge of the Park, another to meet up with the Staffordshires, whilst a further to head for the village – there to meet up with the remaining Staffords. The 1st Queen Victoria Rifles, commanded by Col. Dickins: to advance from Y49 trench, take the German Fern and Fever trenches > pass on to take Feed and Flint > continue over to secure the German rear trench and set up a strong point at the junction with the communication trench Epte. The 1st London Rangers commanded by Col. Bayliffe were to advance from Sector W50 trench, take the German Fetter and Fate trenches > pass on to take Felt trench and Nameless Farm, secure the German rear trench and set up a strong point to enfilade the ground beyond – at the bend in Fame. The 1st London Scottish commanded by Lt. Col. Green were to advance from W51 trench, take the complicated German trench system to its front pass on through to take the German Fact and Fable trench setting up a strong point to secure the right flank – by developing the maze of German trenches. When the German front and second line trenches had been secured the 1st Queen’s Westminster, commanded by Lt. Col. Shoolbred: were to advance from Y48 trench, pass between the London Fusiliers and the Queen Victorias and make for the Quadrilateral – there, to link up with the 1st Sherwood Foresters. 1st Kensingtons, commanded by Lt. Col. Young were to advance in support of the London Scottish. ‘A’ Company and parts of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Company were to construct a communication trench, with the aid of the Cheshire Pioneers and Engineers, between the two front lines in no-man’s-land… constructing fire steps to the right. This working party was to be covered by snipers and their observers… then secured by the Sappers wiring party. At this stage in the war battalion numbers were varied – men were added and taken away almost on a daily basis – after any battle – numbers dropped alarmingly, to the extent that at some stages battalions were combined – to make a fighting unit. As a rough estimate it would be safe to consider a battalion comprising four Companies, each made up of two hundred men, and within this, a squad being about fifty. Part of The Kensington ‘B’ Company and two sections of Headquarter bombers, were to clean up the trenches left by the London Scottish of any lingering Germans. The remainder of ‘B’ Company was to act as a carrying party to move forward ammunition and bombs. Meanwhile most of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies were kept in reserve… whilst lending a hand to keep the London Scottish supplied. Both the London Scottish and the Kensingtons were to protect the right flank from German penetration. On the face of it this is a very sensible plan and considering the artillery supplied quite feasible. But like all plans it doesn’t allow for what the opposition is likely to do and for unknown circumstances. The Germans were never going to sit idly by and allow their deep galleried trenches protected by machine guns to be overrun. After all, their artillery was larger, better designed, more modern, having gun crews better trained. As observed by General Snow, there was this gap between the 56th and the 10^th Division attacking Serre. These were the neighbouring troops a mile away on their right. If the British could take the German trenches quickly, after the artillery had done its job, all would be well? General Rawlinson believed that the only way he would be able to make sure his orders were being carried out was by incessant hard training – by the participants doing everything strictly by rote. He planned for his: ‘Big Push’ to operate like clockwork, relying on detailed planning and continual practice; two operations that were going to win him the battle. Especially now, when he was dealing with Territorial soldiers…, ‘who might not be up to it.’ The British effort was going to be preceded by a 5-day bombardment designed to meet maximum destructiveness. An hour before the advance, smoke shells were to be fired, and the German front line received its final onslaught from the massed guns. From then on, the artillery were going to lay down a creeping barrage 100 yards ahead of the first leading wave – to keep the German’s heads down. Further waves of riflemen were going to give support, clear the taken trenches, and bring up supplies. The infantry would advance in regularly spaced waves, 100 yards apart, five yards between each man; each Company to follow one-after-another with their Captain and Lieutenants following their men. They were to occupy the German trenches, clear them, and keep moving forward. All this movement was to be done according to the strict timetable, so that the leading waves of troops could take full advantage of the softening barrage. Support waves would consolidate and prepare for their next advance. This was not going to be like the child’s game for there could be no stopping – having to keep up with the sequenced shelling. If the leading wave got too far forward their own guns would fire on them, if too far back the Germans would be up out of the dugouts firing at them. Major General Wortley’s 46^th North Midland Division included the 137th North and South Staffords, and the 139th Sherwood Foresters. They would lead the attack on the north side, supported by the 138th Lincolnshire’s and Leicestershire’s. The 139^th Brigade – The Sherwood Foresters – that May, held the Divisional front line at the village of Foncquevillers: burying new telephone cable lines, stacking ammunition, constructing gun pits, and setting up observation posts; all in preparation for the coming battle. Directly to their front the enemy lines were held by the 3^rd battalion of the 91^st Reserve Regiment, part of the 2^nd Guard Reserve Division, all part of Stein’s XIV Reserve Corps. The 9^th and 12^th Companies of the 3^rd battalion were Sherwood’s immediate enemy commanded by Lieutenant der reserve Metzner and Lieutenant der Reserve Overesch. The 46th Division’s front line ran half a mile north of Hebuterne… then 800 yards, up to the left flank of the Sherwood Foresters. The village of Foncquevillers was directly opposite Gommecourt Wood. Here, No Man’s Land was about 400 yards wide, holding the ruins of the Sucrerie, a disused sugar beet factory then in ruins. These ruins were twenty yards from the D6 main road. Northwards, towards Monchy-au-bois, was in German hands. The village of Foncquevillers held the centre of the 46^th Division’s position directly opposite Gommecourt, its Park and Wood. Further north was the German gun position in Pigeon Wood not far from the little salient of trenches called the little ‘Z’ stationed on the British Divisions left flank. This part of the German line which created a small salient was called the SchwalbenNest holding a maxim gun able to enfilade the whole of the German’s line to the east. The previous winter, the occupying British troops came to the conclusion that they were too weak to hold all the line so they selected certain parts for fortifying – wiring them into strong-points, then filling in the remainder with loose wire which became in time weighed down by the weight of the collapsing sides of the trench. The village of Foncquevillers was in a better state of preservation compared to Hebuterne – its neighbouring village. It was recognizable as a one-time place of habitation having most of its buildings still standing. The brick church was still there even if the clock had stopped at 11.45. It’s a crypt housing the battalion ammunition store and the mills cellar the Company Office. The village boasted a YMCA where food could be bought to supplement the boring army rations. It could even be described as a good billet. The brick cottages with their boundary walls giving shelter to their kitchen gardens contained vines and apple orchards. Beyond the patch of grass outside the orchard the ground dipped down to no-man’s-land where work was in progress every night digging a new forward trench… a move guaranteed to give a 100 yard start to the attacking Midlanders all along the sector. This was in keeping with the work being carried out by the 56^th Division on their front.  The 137^th and 139^th Brigades moved forward into trenches opposite Gommecourt Park on the 4th June. In unison the 138^th, the Lincolnshires and Leicestershires, moved back – keeping a supporting role. The thick woodland to their front had been interwoven by dense belts of barbed wire and further belts added in front of every German trench. The British Field guns and mortars had great difficulty in cutting gaps. The German guns took the opportunity whilst the British guns were silent to register their guns on the communication trenches, then stopping before the British guns could ‘range-on’ The British artillery batteries behind Foncquevillers began registering their guns on the 24th June and were allotted 400 rounds per gun to cut through the wire and take out the German gun pits. This allotment of rounds was increased to 700 rounds per day. Work on the gun pits had been suspended by the incessant rain delaying the sighting of many of the guns. As no delay could be contemplated the guns were set up in uncompleted pits. It was opportune that the German artillery was not too active as this was going on.  The activity in the British rear was frantic as new rail track ways, metaled roads, store houses, ammunition and  bomb dumps created close to the front. Compounds were built for prisoners and wounded. General Snow’s plan had the Sherwood Foresters 1/7th battalion attacking as the first wave, with the 1/5^th on their right. The 1/6^th battalion would bring up the rear in support of the two-battalion attack, and the 1/8^th held in reserve to bring forward stores and ammunition. Five minutes before the attack opened the smoke parties would discharge their smoke bombs and candles. The 139^th Brigade would attack with five waves made up of ‘A’,’B’ and ‘C’ Companies having the little ‘Z’ on their left. The fourth would bring up the rear and convert the German front line trench by reversing the firing steps and the fifth hump stores and ammunition. ‘A’ Company were to kick off the battle from the newly dug trench in no-man’s-land, the other two, ‘B’ and ‘C’ formed up in the old trench and ‘D’ the 4th., occupy the Retrenchment line… with the 5^th in Green Street. There would have been about 200 men in each wave. Gommecourt Park, most of the village, and the Chateau were not to be attacked by the Foresters for they were not to stop but to keep going… to meet up with the 56^th coming from the other side of the Park. (An order of the day requested attacking battalions to keep back from all future attacks one Company from each battalion – to act as a reserve and core for a future retraining program in times when the bulk of the battalion had been lost.) The Brigade’s targets were the German trenches to their front – given the identifying names Food and Fork, between the little ‘Z’ on their right and the communication trench Orinocho, making for Pigeon Wood. To the left would be ‘The little Z’ – the SchwalbenNest, a salient sticking out from the line, on the side of the main road leading from the North Foreland. This salient – step in the line, was always a danger if not eliminated by the main bombardment, for it would allow the Germans to enfilade the attacking force – by having a clear line of fire on the Sherwoods left flank. As it turned out no special attention was given to this by the planners which was to be a terrible mistake. A’ Company practically lost all their men immediately, as soon as they emerged from their trench. A number of ‘B’ and ‘C’ made it to the German front line ‘A’, allowing twelve men to carry on to the German second line ‘B’. A number of attempts were made to rally the men; but exhaustion caused by the previous day’s march back to lines, atrocious weather conditions, flooded trenches, and unbroken wire, defeated them. Their spirits were not to be roused…