1920 – 1940

1920 – 1940

The Kensingtons were the first of the 4th London Brigade to report their mobilisation complete’… declares Sergeant Bailey in his half of the book The Kensingtons. Battalion Orders were received: to prepare for Foreign Service 28th October, 1914. On Sunday the 3rd November the Battalion followed the band to Watford Station to board a train for Southampton to take up station on their steamship S. S. Matheran, bound for Le Havre and Rest Camp No., 1. Even before mobilisation they were a well-trained formation. The previous four months experience: marching from Watford, sailing to France, manning a front line trench, and undergoing all the rigours of trench life, had made them incomparable veterans. Its four Companies had seen a lot of action, thankfully losing few men but thankfully maintaining a high proportion of their original pre-war volunteers. The men were in the main well educated city men, previously working as managers and office workers in London’s business sector. On the 18th. In November, one half of the Battalion found itself occupying a trench south-east of Fauquissart. From the 21st their duties were shared with the other half in a three-day rota system. The Kensingtons first battle was Neuve Chapelle where they acted as Brigade Reserve. From the middle of March 1915 the Battalion were to share all the hazards of regular formations, for their baptism of fire was now over. Each of the Battalions prided themselves on their local town content – representing a particular part of London. Conan Doyle has Sherlock Holmes characterise a stockbroker’s clerk who appears in one of his cases as, ‘Representative of the type found in one of our better London Volunteer regiments. Each of the Battalions prided themselves on their core that represented a particular part of London. Within the London Division were Brigades, each Brigade comprised a number of Battalions – overseas, headquarters, another in training, each Battalion had four rifle Companies made up of three platoons, comprising a number of squads. These multiples could be increased to four or more in times of war and shed in times of peace.  After each battle the fighting strength of a platoon was made good by stripping away from the Headquarters Company. To specify exactly the strength of each during an engagement is impossible. Accurate figures can only be found via the diary of each company. These are not always available. Each battalion had a number of other companies in support of the riflemen, who were in the front line. These were headquarters staff, transport, armorer, catering and other specialists i.e., machine gun, mortar or bomb. Backing up the front line troops were the reserves, support companies, ammunition parties, signallers, stretcher-bearers (Band members), and pioneers. When the Kensington battalion took over the trenches at Hebuterne from the 8th Middlesex on the 21st May communication trenches had been established. The ruins of the village provided some cover from German snipers in Gommecourt Park although it was in the range of German artillery in their rear. Battalion Headquarters was established in the mill’s cellars which fortunately had its entrance well sandbagged to prevent the occasional enemy fire. It was obvious to all the men that an attack was imminent. The stacks of supply dumps, additional ammunition and bombs, new pipelines and railway tracks, road works and gun-pits were everywhere. The weather was beautiful allowing the preparation to be made in near perfect conditions. However, this was not to last. A draft of 200 men went some way towards making up for men lost. Behind the village dumps were being laid out for ammunition and shells and tapes laid for other supplies. By this time the battalion in company with the rest of the brigade knew that a trench was to be dug in No Man’s Land. The digging parties were all supplied with the necessary picks, shovels, and sand bags. At night parties went out and cut lanes in the British wire in preparation and laid tapes. The British front line, prior to the construction of the new trench, was initialled as Sector Y: it then crossed the D27 Road. Lt-General Snow gave the task of constructing a new British front line trench, to Brigadier General Loch. It was to be dug halfway between the British and German lines and identified with the letter S instead of R. This new front line was provided with communication trenches that both linked to the rear areas, the village of Hebuterne, and Brigade Headquarters in the mill. The 56th Division (three Brigades totalling 3,000 men) were ordered to construct this new forward line in No Man’s Land, 400 yards in front of the existing trench. This was to extend for almost two miles, the work being done on the nights of the 25th/26th May and identified with the omission of the old front lines identification letter S. The Germans observed all this activity but did nothing about it, not appreciating its significance – keeping well down behind their trench wall – sheltering from a huge barrage which was partly meant to achieve a distraction from what was going on. This new advanced trench was dug with little loss of life, which was a fine achievement. Volunteers were called for, within the 167th to man the trench that night. The following night the trench was deepened, and firing steps cut in. This action saved many lives. This very simple expediency, like linking shell holes or pushing out a sap, allowed attacking troops to get closer to the enemy front line. It was a pity that the new trench on the 46th front was so inadequate. This trench building was no mere casual arrangement but a well-organised undertaking. The task was given artillery support, if necessary, and a number of ruses to confuse the Germans whilst the work was underway. Its construction went a long way towards the successful penetration of the German front line on the day of the battle. The days during, and preceding the attack the 167th Brigade stood guard in this trench, staying until relieved by the 168th and 169th Brigades before the attack on the 1st July. The 46th Division also made an effort to do the same only their trench did not have the same support. Their poor attempt was undermined by the two days of incessant rain which half-filled the trench. These new advanced trenches were dug with little loss of life, which was a fine achievement. The following night the trenches were deepened and firing steps cut in. The German front-line trench was sectioned off and given a code name beginning with the letter ‘F’ and the connecting trenches with an ‘E’. Behind this forward trench was the German second line, also identified with a letter ‘F’ for FABLE and a new third rear trench close to the D6 main road. The British artillery behind Hebuterne and Foncquevillers started registering their pieces on the 24th June the object being to sever and flatten the wire, whilst taking out the plotted German strong points. As the day of the battle approached the bombardment intensified. The German’s meanwhile noted where the guns were firing from, but did nothing. Prior to the battle all the communication trenches were made ‘up’ trenches until after the initial waves had gone forward. It was made clear that the previous direction for each communication trench would then be returned to its original task. This order was to lead to a terrible confusion when the wounded were being ferried back and Company runners tried to get through with their orders. This is a Roll Call of active Kensington Officers who took part in the battle. In all there were 23, on the 1st July, 1916. Men involved in the attack on the 1st July were 615, of all ranks. The commanding officer was Lt-Colonel W. H. Young who had only been attached to the battalion two days before. He was stationed at battalion HQ in the mill’s cellar, organising support. Second in command was Senior Major Cedric C. Dickens. Major Mackenzie. Adjutant: Lt C. N.C. Howard, Transport Officer: Lieut. Holland, Medical Officer: Lieut. Keen, Quartermaster, Lieut. Ridley and Drum-Major Skinner. All bandsmen were the battalion’s Stretcher bearers. The Pioneer battalions were created as a new concept in the British Army in 1914, with a role to provide the Royal Engineers with skilled labour, and to relieve the infantry from some of its non-combatant duties. Pioneers became the workhorses of the Expeditionary Force and acted in conjunction with the army\: constructing roads, bridges, working on entrenchments, fortifications, making mines, and constructing approaches. They are provided with proper clothing, hatchets, saws, axes spades, and entrenching tools. The Coldstream Guards, and over three dozen County regiments, created at least one pioneer battalion. Several new Army battalions were raised specifically as Pioneers, while others were converted Territorials or Kitchener units formed originally as conventional infantry. The Pioneers adopted a badge of a cross rifle and pick. They wired no man’s land, dug trenches, and revetted in all weathers, and in all terrains. On many occasions, later in the war, they abandoned their working tools and fought alongside the infantry, repelling enemy attacks. In their efforts to stem the German offensives of 1918, several Pioneer units fought themselves to virtual annihilation. The work of the Pioneer battalions has been largely ignored or misunderstood. Far from being the units of the old and infirm, these sixty eight battalions played a major role in the Allied victory. A detail of the 5th Cheshire Pioneer battalion, attached to the 56th Division, were constructing strong points in the German trenches, turning the firing positions to face the opposite direction – towards the German’s new front line. On the right flank the Kensingtons ‘A’ Company and Pioneers were to dig a new flank-facing trench under Major Dickens’ leadership. A platoon of pioneers was detailed off to wire up the German side of the trench when completed. The Royal Engineer detachment was responsible for making sure the British wire barrier to the front had been opened sufficiently for the troops to advance, and the German wire gapped to allow the infantry to carry through – to take the German frontline trench. There was a problem that the gaps were too narrow. Bangalore Torpedoes were used the night before to ensure breaches were made. As soon as the charge went up the Germans knew not only what was afoot, but where – giving them a chance to fix their machine gun lines on the gaps before the troops could reach them. Just as the artillery bombardment and the creeping barrage it was all a matter of timing. If you got it wrong someone was going to die. In 1916, military communications were provided by the Royal Engineers Signal Service (Royal Corps of Signals was formed in 1920). Communications in the front line area were maintained by using line and telephone between forward positions and formation headquarters. To effectively mask what was going on a screen of smoke was laid down by smoke shells and mortar bombs. This did not stop the German’s knowing an attack was likely to be made but did instil confidence in the advancing troops and saved lives. However, as happened on the 56th front, the smoke was so thick they could not see the gaps in the wire – not knowing which way to turn. It took a few moments for the Company Sergeants to direct the men to the gaps in the wire. In all instances it requires immediate effective control by the officers leading the men to make their orders understood. In the case of the 56th this happened and all was well. In the case of the 46th more smoke was not made and the men were mown down. During the battle, information about what was happening to the advancing troops was relayed by a runner attached to the senior field officer. This would probably be the Company runner. The Captain would be stationed behind his Company that was moving forward. Once the runner had left with a message, subsequent messages had to be made by a rifleman who might not know where the Company or Headquarters was stationed. The message would take at least half an hour to receive an answer. Signalling by flag was out of the question. Once the field telephone lines were snagged, torn, or cut, resighting the artillery – to take on specific targets- became impossible to order. Someone, able to give instructions to the gun layer, had to see the fall of shot – to be sure a straddle – one shot over and one shot short could be made. Once the men had begun to advance the rear Headquarters would have very little idea how the battle was progressing. Spotting from the air was the only recourse only in this instance the smoke was so thick nothing could be seen. Unless the advancing troops could take-out the machine gun nests themselves the battle would be lost. In many instances acts of heroism achieved these nests were eliminated. This was going to be the biggest battle so far – conceived to take the strain off the French who were beginning to buckle at Verdun. The artillery had enveloped the German trenches with continuous fire for weeks. Most men thought it inconceivable that the artillery could not and did not achieve what it had set out to do. They had faith in their officers when they were told it was going to be a walk over. Officers carried walking sticks as did many senior NCOs. After all the planning every detail must have been covered… surely? As daylight began to break on the horizon the men in the front line trenches prepared themselves. Some washed, some shaved, and others repacked their packs and collected all their things around them. Breakfast was consumed and hot tea was drunk. Again they check for the umpteenth time their possessions. The men nervously chatted about anything and everything with much false laughter and bonhomie. Now the guns spoke again. It was rapid fire, a last period of hate which obliterated the German lines in lightning flashes, plumes of smoke and fountains of flung soil. The earth began to trickle once more from the sides of the trench as the ground quivered. It was hell on earth. They began to wonder if the wire in front of them was broken and the machine gun nests destroyed. They would soon find out. At 07.26 the British gunners discharged their last rounds of their preparatory barrage. Now they concentrated on producing a smoke-screen – a combination of explosive shells and smoke bombs – calculated to cause maximum effect. Special sections on both the 46th and 56th fronts were lighting smoke candles and firing smoke bombs from mortars. A dense cloud of smoke drifts about in no-man’s-land. The final loss of shells heralded the start of the attack. The men in the firing line never experienced anything like the ferocity, for they felt it through their feet. Those on the firing steps could see the trees in the wood enveloped in smoke, and hurled about like twigs in an autumn gale. In the final minutes the trench mortars contributed a further last few rounds of smoke bombs as Gommecourt disappeared in a white mist, flaming shot and shattered vegetation. It appeared like complete saturation, which could not be withstood… The men waiting to go over the top were lulled into a false sense of security. Their officers had told them that it was going to be literally a walk-over. They were equipped for such an event being loaded down with all that would be needed to pursue the enemy. Duck-boards were carried to bridge the trenches, food, water, ammunition, bombs, spare drums and belts for the machine guns, everything for a stay of three days before relief got to them. The average load was sixty pounds plus their rifle. The supporting troops had also picks and spades to alter the German trench and do the necessary repairs, whilst stretcher bearers and engineers brought up the rear to give, succour, support, and communication. They had practised often and now it was the time to put their practice into action. No two men had exactly the same kit – to go over the top with. Some had ladders, some bombs, others spare ammunition and water. Company runners may have carried a basket of pigeons and signallers their flags. The Royal Engineers attached to the forward troops carried spare flex and tools for repairing breaks in the telephone wire. It was not envisaged by the commanders that the attacking force was likely to return the same day. The plan was to hold the taken German positions for a number of days – until the supporting troops from the rear regularised their positions. The relevant Headquarter vialling sergeants had prepared a special breakfast and passed out bread and bully beef to sustain them until the cookhouse staff could join the forward troops and set up their stoves. On the north side the 5th Leicester held the British Front Line south of Foncquevillers. They had moved into their trenches on June the 4th patrolling at night to check the Germans were not preparing to attack or put out their own patrols. The Germans had been faced with days of similar bombardments, forewarning them – now knowing that an onslaught was heralding an attack. They were on their toes as soon as the artillery stopped. The machine gun crew’s practised setting up their pieces in three minutes flat – told that they were the savours of their position. Lookouts were posted using their periscopes to give the alarm in time. When the British smoke-screen was laid the alarm was given. Now was the time to put their practice into good use…The Sherwood Foresters had never felt such an effect before. The ground was trembling, which they could feel in their legs, and the trench sides were trickling with streams of dislodged earth. The puddles in the trench bottoms lapped about, over the duck boards. Those brave or stupid enough to glance over the parapet could see the wood to their front disintegrating – trees being hurled into the air and branches being snapped off, to be flung about. At 7.30 the smoke bombs and explosive shells stopped. Section leaders shouted, as The Staffords began to scramble out onto the parapet, there to form up, port arms, and start to walk towards the enemy down the sloping ground into no-man’s-land. As the Company Sergeants lent a hand to get the men out of the trench to form the second wave, the first had cleared the last of the British wire. The next wave was struggling out of their trench, some up ladders, others climbing on boxes, whilst the sergeants grabbed their equipment… helping all to form up. So far all was going well, the men kept station, as they made their way through the smoke into Gommecourt Wood. Now they could feel the wind getting up blowing the smoke away, thinning it sufficiently for the Germans to see the long lines of troops coming towards them… This sparked several Germans to clamber out of their trenches without their equipment, to rush forwards with their hands in the air. On the other side of the park The London Rifle Brigade were doing the self-same thing. Long lines of men were making sure they were in position walking quickly and quietly through the gaps in their own barbed wire, made the night before using Bangalore torpedoes. Just after 07.00 on the 1st July German observation posts on their right front – manned by the German 91st Reserve Regiment, reported, ‘A smoke-screen was being laid down.’ As the rest of the British Divisions advanced the Kensingtons on the far side of the 56th Division held back – waiting for the London Scottish to move forward a hundred yards, before they too formed up to follow on. Even though the German wire had been gapped and the smoke screen laid down the German machine guns had reaped a terrible harvest. The dogged London Scottish had by 08.00 penetrated the German line. They were the first of the 56th Division to move into and past the first German trench.  In spite of the terrible fire, the men went forward trying to keep in line, at a steady pace. The German wire was supposed to be cut – by the artillery fire, but in many places was untouched. Trying to get over the wire, the strands caught in their equipment or became wrapped around their legs. It was discovered later that the Germans had moved back to their rear trenches. Onward marched the London Scottish to take, and move past, the German second line – making for the other side of the maze of enemy trenches and – Fable and the German third trench. The advance continued until all the German trenches on the right flank of Gommecourt were in British hands. Part of the 169th Brigade – the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, followed up – moving up over the captured German trenches between the London Rifles and Queen Victoria’s to start the linking up movement with the North Midland Division – when they moved down from the north. As this was happening, a section of the Cheshire Pioneers were constructing strong points in the German trenches and repositioning the firing steps to face the German’s new front line. The Westminster’s had received many casualties – from bypassed Germans who were emerging from their deep dugouts – shooting them in the back. As the German artillery began to realise what was happening they started shelling no-man’s-land and their own abandoned front line. As there were no officers available to direct the bombing – to clear the German dugouts, second lieutenant George Arther left his Pioneer Section to take over the attack. Though slightly wounded he instilled resolution in the men about him. Forcing their way forward the bombers got to within 400 yards of the German trench, almost within reach of where they were to join up with the North Midland Division. Meanwhile the British Artillery bombardment was directed onto the German artillery – to act as a counter battery. They in turn were replying, shooting into No Man’s Land disrupting the supply of ammunition and bombs making the British advance difficult – through lack of support. There was a shortage of ammunition and bombs. Fortunately for the Germans, the right sector of their fire trenches – facing the 46th North Midland Division, was not being shelled. This allowed the sheltering Germans there to leave their deep dugouts to see what was going on. The ground to their front looked towards no man’s land and Foncquevillers, a distance of just over 400 yards. The surface was level gradually dipping down into no-man’s-land giving them a completely open vista. They could see the smokescreen being blown about thinning in some places and clearing in others. Through these gaps the British North Midlanders could be seen coming towards them.  The Germans set off their alarms and their trenches began to fill with breathless men. Those manning the Maxim machine guns had to assemble them and arrange their ammunition to be close at hand. The order was given for rapid fire.  The order was given to the London men to attack and the section leaders shouted to the men to form up. Long lines of men set off making sure they were in line, dressed five yards between each as they walked through the gaps in their own barbed wire made the night before. The British artillery bombardment had been lifted to raise their sights to the next aiming point. The London Division’s advance was downhill into a shallow valley, then up the other side towards the village – towards the road, Nameless Farm, and finally the Quadrilateral. The attack was across open ground enfiladed by German machine guns and artillery. All troops were told to advance at walking pace, keep in a straight line, and not to bunch up.

Manning the German Line before the 56th Division was the 91st Reserve Regiment. Their look-out men had not been so observant, this coupled with a smoke screen that had been laid thicker completely masked what the British troops were doing. This slow reaction meant the Germans took longer to man their trenches and erect their machine guns allowing the 56th Division to make particularly good progress. The previous night a number of British patrols had blown gaps in the German wire with Bangalore torpedoes which helped enormously the next day. By 08.00 the bulk of the 56th were in the German front line trenches taking prisoners, others had even gone further into the German support trenches beyond. On the left flank of the 46th Divisions Front the 5th and 7th Sherwood Foresters had risen up out of their front line trenches and formed up… They felt confident that their gunners had done a fine job, their officers had been telling them for weeks that the bombardment had flattened the German trenches and there would be no opposition. They did as they were instructed and marched forward, finding gaps in the wire – entered the Gommecourt wood, after having first moved past the maze of forward German front line trenches. They were making for the Quadrilateral, the heart of the Kern Redoubt.  Following orders they were not stopping, leaving the passed over trenches to be mopped up by the later waves following on. They were not to know that the wind had risen and driven the smoke-screen away revealing the follow up waves to the Germans. These men of the Sherwood Foresters were never seen again. As another wave of the Sherwoods left their trenches the German field guns, stationed at Monchy – further to the north, were now alerted to the fact that an attack was on. They joined in the machine gun fire enfilading from the Schwalben Nest (little ‘Z’) and those from the German front line. The enemy field guns, previously laid down onto the communication trenches and no-man’s-land, plastered these positions. The British carrying parties, heavily loaded down, were caught in the middle not knowing whether to go forward or back. The machine gun fire decimated them as they tried to move.  On the 46th right flank, on either side of the D6 main road, the first two waves of the South and North Staffordshires were held up – not finding a gap in the German wire, particularly around the Sucrerie. The slaughter was enormous as the men were trying to clamber over the dead, dying, and wounded, many impaled on the wire. Universally it was the officers and rallying Sergeants who were killed leaving the men without orders or leadership. Those who did finally find a gap and had sought cover in the wood were rounded up by the now fully alerted German defenders. ‘A’ Company of the Leicestershires plus two other platoons, and their leading Sub-Lieutenants, started out to make their way to the Sucrerie to begin to construct a communication trench stretching to the German front line. They started to mark out the extent it was to take. It was a hopeless task – as the German machine guns were continually raking the ground around forcing them to take cover. It became painfully obvious that it was a hopeless task and the detailed troops were ordered back to the start line. There they found the Staffordshires waiting for the order to make another attempt to move forward into the woods. To the south, on the other side of Gommecourt, the 56th support Companies were advancing… joining those others who had been first in the German Line. The German artillery now took up the challenge. A move was then made to stabilise the capture of the German second line by the Pioneers. All the German trenches were now in British hands. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles continued moving through the London Rifles to start the linking up movement with the North Midland Division moving down from the north. The London Scottish on the extreme right also made excellent progress towards the main road, where they were to set up a strong point.  After having their rum issue the Queen Victorias stood-to till 7-25a.m when they put up a smoke screen and went over the top at 7-30 with the London Scottish and Queen’s Westminster Rifles bringing up the rear. They took four lines of trenches from the Germans, but were driven back by midday to their original position. Losses were very heavy although taking many prisoners. The Germans made a special effort to kill all those men directing, marshalling, and leading the attack. These officers and leading NCOs were easily identifiable for they wore a smarter uniform, carried walking sticks, and side arms. The Germans were so adept at doing this that attacking forces soon lost all their commanding officers and NCOs. In proportion far more replacement officers were needed. In many cases men of lesser rank carried on superior jobs. This action was particularly felt during this attack on Gommecourt. By late morning, part of the Kensington battalion, on the right flank of the line, was about to dig a connecting trench in no man’s land. The London Rangers and Queen Victorias were on their left making for the third rear German trench, Nameless Farm, and the main road. The 10th Division at Serre, a mile away on the 56th Divisions right flank, had been pushed back. A result of the attack petering out the German artillery switched their sights onto No Man’s Land and W Sector trench – behind the London Scottish. It was here that the rest of the Kensingtons were preparing to make for no man’s land, after being told the London Scottish had passed the first two German trenches – to start digging the connecting trench. The Germans shelled the trench to such a degree the Kensingtons lost half their men – very few had even the opportunity to get out of the trench. The Kensingtons sector trench W48R was only four feet wide and packed with the men unable to move because the trench was so full of dead, dying, and wounded men. Major Dickens sent back word at 13.00 hours that there were few men left to hold their existing position – that he was the only officer left. Could he please have instructions? The Kensingtons lost sixteen officers and three hundred men (Major Dickens was killed by a sniper eight weeks later). To the north things were going from bad to worse. The 46th Division had started off but had been defeated by the German barbed wire which had not been gapped. The previous night’s rain had turned their trench into a morass; some of the men were knee deep in mud all night long. It was difficult to get the second wave of men out in time. As they appeared in dribs and drabs on the top, they were machine gunned down on top of others trying to get out. The slipping, clawing men could not get a hold of the trench side for the dead and wounded were blocking the ladders. There were long rows of dead and dying men piling up on the parapet making it even more difficult. The officers were standing on the parapet helping men out and ordering others to support the men in front. Another wave of men was ordered forward only to be mown down again. By this time men were refusing to move, staying with the wounded in shell holes huddled together. Further north – in the centre, things were a little better. The Germans there had not been so quick allowing the Sherwood Foresters’ to get into the front line trench… clear it, and make towards the support line. The Germans erected a machine gun – facing to their rear – back onto their own lines and took the attackers in the rear. By the end of the morning their trenches were clear. A sortie was made by the Lincs and Lanks. Late in the day they were to seek stragglers and survivors… but in the end they had to give up and return to their own lines. The previous day it was suspected by the Germans that the British were going to attack but not exactly when. The British preparations had always been made obvious to suggest a main attack – to divert attention away from Rawlinson’s ‘Big Push’… the ruse was having the desired effect. The 91st German Reserve Regiment, on the north side of Gommecourt Park, had the luck to find the smoke-screen patchy at best and non-existent in others. They were rightly alarmed and using their practised preparations manned their front line and prepared for hostilities. The Germans easily repelled the invaders, gunning down the waves of troops coming towards them. The North Midlanders were not a serious threat even though many limited assaults were made throughout the day. Those who had made it faced almost immediate expulsion. Conditions in the trenches on the 46th Divisions front were horrific. The German field guns had bracketed the area and the trench was full of the dead and dying. Those who were still active were crouching down too exhausted to make any move. At 15.30 the British artillery resumed their bombardment to prepare the way for a renewed attack. Major General Wortley came forward to see that his order was carried out.  The Sherwood Foresters started out again adopting the same tactics. On their right they expected to see Staffordshire, but they had refused to move and were not accompanying them – they were on their own. The order was given once again to return to the old front line. The attack had been a failure. By 16.00 all that was left of the Staffordshires were ordered back out of line, and the 5th Leicestershires took over. On their left the 5th Lincolnshires did a similar job relieving the Sherwood Foresters. On the London Division’s front it was a different story. The smokescreen had been efficiently laid by the Royal Engineers and did all that it was supposed to do. The London Rifles, Queen Victoria’s, Irish Rangers, and London Scottish, had all penetrated into the German lines helped by the bombardment and smoke-screen. The Westminster’s worked their way through The Rifles and Victorias into the German third trench and The Kensingtons followed on, after the London Scottish. All found the smoke-screen almost impenetrable having been laid so thickly that some of the forward British troops became lost and disorientated. By 08.30 the 56th Division was well on its way – making for the D6 road trench, by jumping into the German front line (F) working their way forward through the communication trenches. Many of the dazed Germans were captured and led back. All along the trench mini battles were raging as both parties bombed each other. By 9.00 the first objectives had been reached and the leading British troop had penetrated over a mile towards the Kern redoubt where they were to link up with the North Midlanders. On the Londoner’s left Gommecourt Park and village, on the right Nameless Farm – on the D6 Hebuterne-Fuquay Road, and a little further, the maze of German trenches – to be made into a strong-point by the London Scottish. Now the German 170 Reserve Regiment (52nd Division) prepared to counter-attack. Von Below arranged for 55 Reserve Regiment to attack with four companies to the north and nine companies to the south, including two from the 2nd Guards Reserve. By midday and early afternoon this counter-attack began to be felt. The first things to be destroyed by the Germans were the barricades erected by the Pioneers and Engineers allowing them to retake their old trench. The whole London Division was now beginning to run out of bombs and ammunition. The German artillery was ordered to shell no-man’s-land. Little by little the British were put under pressure giving up well earned territory, leaving pockets of desperate troops in shell-holes, providing some respite from the machine guns and barrage. The German 2nd Guards Reserve Division having been pushed back almost out of the salient were now recovering, still holding Fricourt in the front line. What was left of the Kensingtons, including part of the London Scottish machine gun section, was preparing to repel any German foolish enough to try to take it back. After a period of four hours, they were still in position, although by now the Westminsters had been pushed back to the first line – along with the bulk of what was left of the Division. The diversionary tactics formulated by the British Headquarters Staff was working – diverting German efforts onto their front in accordance with the original plan. Now the Germans, having destroyed the 31st Division at Serre – on the Kensingtons right, relayed their guns – to shell no-man’s-land on the Kensingtons front – which was nearest to them. As the 46th was enfiladed, so too the 56th – it was a devastating barrage. It felt like, ‘a curtain of steel’, writes Christopher Moore in ‘Trench Fever’ no-man’s-land was cut off. Major Dickens and his men could receive no help from reserves or stretcher bearers, for they were stuck out in front – with very little cover – having to suffer the awful bombardment. Now the situation on the 56th right was becoming untenable. The prime object had been achieved. Linking up with the 46th would have been helpful straightening up the line. But taking on a very strong trench and dugout system, still in good working order, without reserves could/would be described as rash. The worst decision was to do nothing, for the Germans were beginning to take stock and recover fast. On the 56th left, the Westminsters had moved up, between the London Rifles and the Queen Victorias; they were prepared to start a bombing attack on the rear of the Gommecourt Garrison. Unfortunately, the Westminsters had received too many casualties, and there was no one to direct the attack. Leaving his pioneers, Second Lieutenant George Arther led the attack, though slightly wounded. Forcing their way forward the bombers got to within 400 yards of the German third trench, almost within reach of where they were to join up with the North Midland Division. The North Midlanders had fared badly – they had been forced back. There were one or two groups who were holding out against strong opposition. Once again they continued the attack to try and link-up with the Westminsters who were bombing their way towards them. General Snow demanded another attack pressing the Divisional commander to order another attack using the supporting troops. Six battalions of the 46th had started that morning all had been driven back, there were only two companies left. No officers had survived. Snow ordered the North Midlanders to repeat their attack again that afternoon – to link up with the London Division, which by then was being counter-attacked – gradually being forced back to the captured German trench to their rear. The Germans, on the other hand, were now over their initial shock getting stronger by the minute. It did not take them long to understand the significance of the British plan. Not that they understood the battle of Gommecourt was a diversionary attack, but that these two opposing divisions were trying to encircle them. They had every intention to make sure that did not happen. Now the German artillery, behind Serre, ranged in, joining those behind the Quadrilateral to bombard no-man’s-land and the British front line. Gradually the British troops began to run out of ammunition. Most of the senior officers who had set out in the morning were now either dead or injured. The afternoon wore on and the fighting continued… only the pockets of resistance were getting smaller. There were now seventeen hundred men dead, two hundred taken prisoner and over two thousand wounded. Most of these were lying about on the battlefield. The Germans systematically raked these with machine gun fire making sure solitary resistance did not break out. All around the wounded lay broken barbed wire, military equipment, and the dead, and dying. Their task was to somehow crawl from hole to hole skirting those areas of water that were too deep, keeping below the sky-line. This was the end to a bitter fight begun with such high hopes. By late afternoon the guns of both sides stopped firing. The odd man capable of crawling began to make their way back. Stretcher-bearers from both sides were moving about amongst the wounded. The badly injured were calling out, some for water others for comfort. The parties of first-aiders give succour to either side not making a distinction. There were 4,749 casualties in the London Division alone out of nearly 60,000 that started out just over eight hours before. The ground was pitted with shell holes filled with storm water and the debris of war. All around them was broken barbed wire, military equipment, and the dead and dying. Their task was to somehow crawl from hole to hole skirting those areas of water that were too deep, keeping below the sky-line. As the afternoon wore on the fighting broke out again. Of the two battalions on the right flank there were only four officers and seventy men remaining of the main attacking force holding onto the German trenches. They were gathered together holding a series of shell holes and half built trenches. It was now touch and go whether there was going to be a total rout. One or two other smaller groups were making their way back passing the dead and dying giving hope to those remaining that they would be remembered.  The 46th Division, now back in their original front line positions had come to the conclusion their hope to link up with the 56th had to be abandoned. The first Company of the Sherwood Foresters had reached the German third line in the morning capturing several prisoners who in the end had to be released. Some of the men had reached the meeting-place surrounding the Quadrilateral. Once the 31st Division had been driven away from Serre the German guns could now take up the battle against the 46th and swing round to the right enfilading the remnants in no-man’s-land. The 5th Lincolnshires who had taken over the front made another advance at midnight to give support to any Sherwood Foresters still holding out. They in turn were heavily resisted and lost many men. Later still, when the light was poor, more stragglers started to drag themselves in. They were tired, hungry and distressed having got so far and not in the end succeeding. The Germans were again moving about in no-man’s-land not only finding their own wounded but directing their first-aiders and stretcher-bearers to find the English wounded too. This concern for the wounded was reciprocated. It was a seven to one battle, in favour of the Germans.  Occasionally, they would see and hear German and British stretcher parties swearing and cursing at the state of the ground picking up the wounded and staggering off. Those less wounded started to drag themselves in, they were tired, hungry and distressed, having got so far and not in the end succeeding. Late in the evening a steady rain was falling. The cries and moans of the wounded could just be heard. Occasionally there would be the crack of a rifle shot. In the distance a flare goes up and a louder bang, of an artillery piece which shakes the ground. It was no easy matter for the retiring sections to melt into the ground. On the 2nd July much effort was made to tidy up the front line and to collect the dead and wounded on both fronts. By the evening of the second day, about 21.00, the Leicesters were relieved by the London Rangers who moved over from the south. What remained of the 46th Division marched back to Bienvillers au Bois shepherding the late comers still making their way back from the battle field. The Kensingtons were relieved that same night by the 8th Middlesex. Those who were left marched back to the old French trenches to relieve the 4th Lincolns in trenches on the north side of Foncquevillers.

The total casualties on the Somme were over 1,300,000 divided equally between allies and the Germans. The battle finally ended on the 14th November 1916, British losses were 400,000. The 56th Division suffered grievously. The figures speak for themselves. The attack on The Kern Redoubt was successfully taken the following year. The casualties on the first day of battle. Lt General Rawlinson attacked with thirteen divisions on a front fifteen miles long north of the River Somme, and the French with five divisions on a front of eight miles mainly south of the river, where the German defence system was less highly developed. The unconcealed preparations on the Gommecourt front and the long bombardment starting on the 24th June had given away any surprise. This was part of the battle plan envisaged by Generals Haig and Rawlinson. Later findings confirm that the Germans knew they were going to be attacked and had a good idea when, how, and why. Their knowledge and guesses confirms the deception plan was working which was in accordance with the wishes of the British General Headquarters and part of the grand strategy. The more unsure and on-edge the Germans were made to feel – with numerous excursions to their front, the better. These diversions would help the main British attack – drawing away possible German attention, reserves, and resources. No General worth his salt would plan a campaign without such a plan in place. This was not clever but proper military thinking. The German troops taking part in the defence numbered 24,000 men. They suffered 601 casualties, of which 185 were killed. Most of the attacking British battalions lost half their men… each battalion had about 800 men. On the morning of the 1st July at 7.15, German observation stations reported a smoke-screen developing on both sides of the salient. Although the British bombardment had been intensified since 6.25, the German fire trenches – facing north-west, (the Staffords front), were not being shelled. Several German observers of the local 91st Reserve Regiment garrison came up from their deep dug-outs to see what was happening. To their front, the ground ran level to the Staffords lines 400-500 yards distant beyond the village of Foncquevillers; on their right the one-time Sucrerie. Christopher Moore’s, Trench Fever, proclaims that by 09.00 the commander of the Staffords, Brigadier-General Williams, knew that any of his men surviving would not resume the attack – they had had enough. The Fifth Leicesters who were there in support were told the artillery was being called for a further shoot, and that his job was to organise another wave attack. Major-General Wortley personally took charge realising that a firm hand was necessary – to see that it was carried out. The Sherwood Foresters were on the left, and Staffords and Fifth Leicesters on the right. It was to be a repeat of the morning’s attack, preceded by an artillery barrage, and smoke-screen, planned for a 12.15 start. This new attack was delayed a number of times because the communication trenches were clogged up with the dead and wounded. Stretcher bearers were ferrying the injured away, and resupply parties struggling forward each jostling each other as they tried to get past. All along the 46th front collapsed trenches were under shell-fire. The previous heavy rain washed away the battered sides making the trench shallower. At 15.30 the British artillery commenced their bombardment, and the few stokes mortars added their smoke-screen. On the left the smoke was so thin that Brigadier Shipley of the Sherwood’s ordered his men to stay where they knew that it would be slaughtered if the attack went ahead. The Staffords, seeing that the Sherwood’s were not getting out of their trench and shell holes, refused to go forward, as did the Fifth Leicesters. It was stale-mate no-one moved…The German artillery, being informed that the British bombardment had started up again and a smoke-screen created, prepared another shoot. Now they were fully alert thinking this was another attack. They redoubled their efforts sending down a shrapnel barrage which caused even more casualties to the wounded men. There were those huddling in shell holes – waiting for a chance to get back to their lines, and the sheltering advancing troops waiting for an inspired officer to lead them forward. By 16.00, Lt-General Snow knew that the 56th was being slowly pushed back and the 46th stalled. He concluded the attack to link up was not going to happen so ordered the attempt to be called off and the original British front line re-established and remanned. The diversion had been made and achieved, but the hope of joining up – of straightening the line to eliminate the salient – had to be abandoned. From now on there would be recriminations. Who was going to pay the price for failure was not so clear. Was it the plan, the planners or the poor bloody infantry? Considering the attack had been purely a diversion and not meant to be a break-out the effort by the Territorials had been very costly. The Grand Plan to help the French was a noble one and its aim strategically necessary. However, the war’s simple objective to remove the enemy was not achieved. Rawlinson’s insistence on a lengthy bombardment – to soften German resistance, was an acceptable strategy, if it had been achieved. It wasn’t because the necessary weapons were not at hand. Haig had preferred a shorter preliminary bombardment and the adoption of skirmishing infantry tactics. This may have worked better but I am doubtful. Haig’s deferment to Rawlinson’s greater experience and fears were in error. No front line soldier would ever limit artillery bombardment to his enemy given the chance. However, this presupposes that the artillery would achieve all its targets and purposes. In this instance the artillery failed miserably. Their expertise at reducing specific targets was pathetic, and their wire cutting skills hopeless. They were not up to the task. This was not necessarily their fault. They were not properly trained, nor did they have the proper weapons or shells. These deficiencies should have been exposed before the battle by Rawlinson. It was after all his plan. The artillery’s goals were an integral part of this plan and had to be achieved. The gunners were quite incapable of backing the infantry although they thought at the time they were doing a good job. The observers could see the targets putting up a shower of earth and smoke but this was simply surface material. The dug in and reinforced bunkers and weapon pits were hardly being touched. The Germans, purposely alerted to the coming attack had retired most of his troops back to the rear trenches, some even to his third trench on the road. That the British had only 60 howitzers along the whole front speaks volumes for only howitzers are produced to project shells to fall vertically. A trajectory necessary to puncture dug-outs and penetrate the top cover to weapon pits. Brigadier Scott’s Presentation: Artillery Survey in World War 1, 22.01.2003, at Woolwich, maintains Britain was not prepared for war in 1914. The artillery had 18-pounder guns and 4.5-inch howitzers with which to raise gun positions and men in dug-outs. Such weapons are only suitable for targets in the open. For the battle on the Somme, Rawlinson had only 105 heavy guns (Farrar-Hockley, The Somme, maintains 107 guns) and howitzers by the previous June: 36 x 60-powder guns, 8 x 6-inch guns, 40 x old 6-inch howitzers, 4 x 8-inch howitzers, 14 x 9.2-inch howitzers and 3 x 15-inch howitzers. Scott maintains: “The state of the maps were poor, and that using flash to bang to determine range was inaccurate”. (Lt-General Allenby commander of the British Third Army later authorised a flash spotting course) The battle relied upon air reconnaissance to locate enemy guns. (Commander Second Army ordered: “Counter-battery work must be a matter chiefly for the heavy artillery and that enemy gun location allotted to the Artillery Intelligence Officer and his assistants attached to each Group Commander. This brought into being the start to official counter-bombardment systems. By 1st July each army had a flash spotting Observation Section of the then 1 Field Survey Company continuously manned connected to observation posts by telephone. However, it took some time for the spotting information to be passed up to the Corps Counter-Battery Officer and down to a gun battery. According to Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, C.B, C.M.G, Royal Engineers. (Retd.), p.s.c.) Official History of the Great War, Vol. 1, and the British guns fired 20,000 tons of metal from the start of the battle on the 24th which was in total 1,627,824 shells of all types. Christopher Moore maintains in Trench Fever, “Perhaps, one third was duds?” What is clear from official records is that most of the shot was shrapnel unsuitable to raise dug-in positions. The tactics chosen to defeat the Germans was to employ the dense and rigid infantry tactics, ‘The Wave System’ employed by Rawlinson, the losses were unnecessarily heavy. Rush and drop, cover and deploy, are the skills of a skirmisher using the terrain. Such tactics might have achieved more. In this instance, it would most certainly have been no worse and possibly better. Giving advancing troops the option of reaching a certain position using whatever tactics the situation demands on the day can have a better result, if resolutely carried out? It was in this that Rawlinson had his doubts. He believed the Territorial resolve and skill was wanting. Rawlinson’s wave system relied on the artillery to lay down a timed barrage before the leading troops – to make the enemy drop down below their parapet. It was judged to the minute and applied to precede the first wave. For this part of the plan to work efficiently the following troops must follow precisely. They should not be too far forward to catch a shot falling short nor too far behind to allow the Germans to pop up. There are a number of ways which would make the system defunct: if the Germans gunned down the first wave the second might not move forward to cover the gap, if the wire was not cut resulting in bunching up, if the terrain was shell holed, slippery, or covered by the dead and dying. Any or all of these would ensure the barrage would begin to be out of sync for the advancing first wave. As a fundamental part of the battle plan – as a way to get the troops to move forward, it was useless and bound to break down. In battle fatigues with normal webbing pouches for spare ammunition tirailleurs can move independently to meet with situations as they appear. If, as was so in this case, the forward troops are weighed down by carrying too much equipment, freedom and flexibility of movement is placed in jeopardy. Supporting troops can bring forward any extra equipment that is needed allowing the time-table for keeping up with the creeping barrage to be met. Rawlinson also wrongly believed the artillery would achieve its target and keep the German heads down. In this he was fundamentally wrong and guilty for not proving so himself. That what he was planning – the opposing guns to be eliminated and German troops to be cowered, was not possible using the weapons he had available nor were the Germans daft enough to place themselves where they could be shelled having forewarned what was going to happen. The smoke-screen was also a large part of the infantry tactic giving cover to those advancing and dismay to those fearing discovery and surprise. Again this weapon was not universally efficient and effective. Rawlinson turned down the use of a night attack fearing uncertainty at best and chaos at worst… once again fearing the poor training of the Territorials. His battle plan was based upon his army’s lack of infantry expertise. Rawlinson and his Headquarters had failed to recognize the depth and strength of the German trench system; insisted on a ‘wave system’ of attack placing far too much reliance on his artillery – not understanding its obvious limitations. Planning diversions are a major part of any battle. Their usefulness can be outweighed if there are too many casualties or loss of equipment. Rawlinson did tell his commanders not to take their attack too far, nor to go forward without making sure the German trenches to their front were abandoned, for there were no reserves or support for a follow-up. These flexible orders relying upon individual decisions made in the heat of battle are susceptible to hasty judgements, there is a tendency for commanders to become dogged – not give up. It requires a strong leader to pull his troops back. The fault was General Snows who persisted in the attack. Rawlinson should have made sure his orders were obeyed. In the end, too much was asked of too few troops, relying on the unknown effects of prolonged shelling. The poor performance of the 46th Division can be attributed to bad preparatory work by the area commanders – to make sure the barbed wire had been rendered useless to the defender. There are no references to suggest efforts were made to find out if there were gaps in the German wire, where, and how extensive, on the night before the battle. In the event that there were none, or, not in the correct places, Bangalore torpedoes were used before the troops made the attack the next morning. This essential check, to ensure the attack had a chance, seems elementary. The lane markers laid, and their positions marked on maps – for battalion commanders. Sniper teams, to give the attackers cover, an essential ingredient – also, to give the advancing troops confidence. The main aim of the attackers is to take the German front line – for that to happen the troops have to get there. The use of smoke, by shell, bomb and candle, to mask attacking weaves is essential – if there is a fear the attackers are being watched – who would prevent them reaching the line, or, if the smoke is too thick so the attackers cannot see the man next to them, it is useless. Having smoke teams in no-man’s-land to ensure that a suitable cover is given is a must if there is any prevailing wind, or there is a possibility the initial cover is badly laid. The guiding tape-lines must be laid whilst it is still dark before the last shell has dropped. There is no point lying cable and tape in no-man’s-land if firing is still going on. The new halfway trench dug on the 56th Hebuterne front should have been more successfully copied on the north, Raiding parties should have been sent out to create unease and uncertainty, and more attention should have been paid to eliminating the machine gun nests at ‘Z’. The North Midland’s strength and vigour prior to the attack had been severely strained by marching backwards and forwards to practise at Lucheux and the ghastly weather. Both added to their misery. It was a seven to one battle in favour of the Germans. Both the 46th and 56th Divisions remained on the battle-field until October. The fact that the attack at Gommecourt did distract the Germans in the end made very little difference to the failed effort of the main battle. The first day’s figures for casualties on the Somme were 57,470 men. General Farrar-Hockley later opinionated, ‘they had not failed at all’. Their task had not been to capture Gommecourt, perhaps the strongest position in the sector, but to divert upon themselves ‘the fire of artillery and infantry which might otherwise be directed against the flank of the main attack near Serre’ was a fact However, pressure could still have been mounted to ensure the ruse was believed… without the needless loss of the vast numbers of men. The point of all the attacks along the front was to take the strain away from the French. In this the battle on the Somme succeeded. Martin Middlebrook maintains with hindsight that the battle should not have been waged at all due to both sides being locked in a stalemate… believing that it would have taken a genius and a brave man to have spoken out. That is true but leaving hindsight aside what occurred was unnecessary slaughter. Rawlinson’s Wave theory was ridiculous as was his reliance on the artillery to take out the German guns, machine gun pits, and to break-up the wire. The infantry were badly handled. Riflemen were that days ‘sharpshooters, skirmishers, or tirailleurs. On the day the Territorials acted like Guardsmen without their irregular forward protectors. Local area commanders should have made greater use of night patrols: to inspect the state of the wire, the shell-holed landscape, and where best cover and entry could be found. Special units should have plotted where static machine gun nests were located, so that a sniper and his observer could remove each one early-on – at the start of the attack – when the first wave went forward. Barbed wire was dealt with by Bangalore torpedoes, early on the first morning, to make sure there were sufficient gaps to prevent bunching up. Local commanders given targets relative to the overall plan then told to get on and devise a solution suited to the local conditions. Constructing a new trench half-way between the front lines – into no-man’s-land, did give greater security and speed-up the attack.  Laying on a smoke-screen to hide the advancing troops; bombarding the German trench system to keep the enemy heads down and inflicting damage; were helpful and did reduce casualties. Greater use of counter-battery work should have been practised though. Even if the two Divisions had met up the redoubt was too strong for the numbers used and the inability to keep the forward troops supplied with ammunition and grenades was a failing. Haig should have insisted on a shorter time spent on the bombardment and the rush and drop tactics of the skirmishers rather than Rawlinson’s wave system. The attack went in at 4.00am led by the 1st London Scottish who got into the German front line… the Kensingtons followed up, after being very patient withstanding the provoked German fire. The British barrage stopped, whistles blew, and section leaders shouted as long lines of men set off making sure they were in line… They walked through the gaps in their own barbed wire made the night before. As the remaining battalions advanced from the newly dug trench they joined the London Scottish by taking over nearly all the German trenches, which was their objective. At Gommecourt, the Kensingtons had achieved success, making use of the new trench dug before the battle, and began a smoke screen to confuse the Germans… the whole front-line system had been taken. On the left, the hard-pressed North Midlanders had not reached the German front line. If they did not achieve their goal, the Kensingtons would be in trouble – be left stranded. Five hours later all the German trenches on the right flank of Gommecourt were in British hands. Part of the 169th Brigade, the Queens Westminster Rifles also followed up moving through the London Division to start the linking up movement with the North Midland Division moving down from the north. As this was happening some of the Cheshire Pioneers were constructing strong-points in the German trenches and turning the firing positions to face the German’s new front line. As the Westminster’s moved up between the Kensingtons and the Queens they were to start a bombing attack on the rear of the Gommecourt Garrison. Unfortunately the Westminster’s had received many casualties and there was no one to direct the attack. Leaving his pioneer second lieutenant George Arther led the attack, though slightly wounded. Forcing their way forward the bombers got to within 400 yards of the German trench almost within reach of where they were to join up with the North Midland Division. The North Midlanders had fared badly and had been forced back towards their own trenches. In the afternoon General Snow ordered the division to continue with the attack that would link up with the London division and the Westminster’s who were bombing their way towards them. The order to continue was unrealistic. Six battalions had started off that morning and all had been driven back. They were ordered forward again but there were only two companies left. No offices had survived. The attack was called off. The Germans, a Saxon Regiment, were on the alert; they had been warned by the bombardment and their lookouts had raised the alarm. The machine gun started to hammer out their awful chorus. The long lines were easy targets. The Germans had seen the gaps in the wire and had laid down fixed lines of fire to cover them. Men bunched up to get through but the terrible machine gun fire flattened them. Things on the left were going badly. The night’s rain had turned their trench into a morass; some of the men were knee deep in mud all night long. It was difficult to get the men out in time. As they appeared in dribs and drabs on the top, they were machine gunned down on top of others trying to get out. There were long rows of dead and dying men. In spite of the terrible fire, the men went on forward trying to keep in line at a steady pace. The German wire was supposed to be cut by the artillery fire but was untouched. Trying to get over the wire, the strands caught in their equipment or wrapped it round their legs. At last, the facts began to be assembled. It was clear that the British High Command had failed even though in places it had achieved its objectives. On the first day the British Army suffered the biggest losses for any single day in the whole war. Figures can never tell the whole story but in this case the casualties were fifty-seven thousand, of which twenty thousand were killed or died from wounds. A whole generation of men were crippled… That kind of slaughter continued until the battle ended in the awful mud of winter. In all it cost over a million casualties, with three hundred thousand British, French and German dead.

The Kensingtons found they had reached part of their objective. The night had been spent in the German trenches taking it in turn to stand guard, which was an eerie sensation with all the cries for help coming from the wounded and the stretcher parties from both sides collecting up the bodies. It was in the original plan to size the German trench system on the right hand edge of the salient then link up with the North Midlanders who were coming from the opposite side. It was hoped to cut off the garrison of German defenders in the village. A company of the Kensingtons and a machine gun section of the London Scottish had crossed over No Man’s Land and reinforced the previous day’s troops. They were the last to do so. During the rest of the morning the Germans put in three attacks to evict the remains of the Division. Gradually the Londoners became weaker. The Kensingtons were acknowledged to be part of a London force that was second to none – having the greatest period of training prior to setting off to France, and had been in the fighting force since the war had begun. The London force were mostly well educated pre-war volunteers from the commercial heart of London and many would have been made into officers in any other division. The advance the previous morning got off to a good start. In the first hour and a half the 168th Brigade, attacking from the newly dug trench in the middle of No Man’s Land, had reached every one of the German trenches in their objective. A fifth of the attacking Londoners were either dead or wounded. By reaching the final trench, they secured for themselves a safe position. The rolling barrage had moved forward as had been planned and the Kensington’s and the other three battalions had moved up with it. The London Rifle Brigade was on the left of the right-hand division, Gommecourt Park with its wooded acres before the village was to their left. The German second Guards Reserve Division pushed back almost out of the salient but still held Fricourt in the front line. What was left of the brigade entered the German trench, which was the first objective ready to repel any German foolish enough to try to take it back including part of the London Scottish machine gun section. After a period of four hours the London Division was still in position, although the Westminster’s had returned to the First Objective line – along with the rest of the division – this still held to the original plan. This line was to the rear of the German Trench, which was in British hands. As explained, there were no reserves so to make a concerted effort to link up with the North Midlands more men would have to be found. The worst decision was to do nothing because the Germans were beginning to take stock and recover. At last, information was beginning to get through to Head Quarters. The corps commanders controlling the diversionary attack at Gommecourt were determined to carry on with the encircling movement. Lieutenant-General Snow ordered the North Midlanders to repeat their attack that afternoon – to link up with the London Division…, which by then was being counter-attacked… gradually being forced back to the captured German trench, behind them. Snow must have known that the diversionary objective had been achieved. Someone was turning this into a separate battle! Although the London Division was being hard pressed it retained coherence, being in the German trench gave the men cover and time to sort themselves out. The Germans, on the other hand, over their initial shock, were getting stronger by the minute. It did not take them long to understand the significance of the British move, not that they understood the battle of Gommecourt was a diversionary one, but that these two divisions were trying to encircle them and join up… They intended to prevent that happening. The German guns were ranging in, joining together to bombard the position. Soon the British troops began to run out of ammunition. Most of the senior officers who had set out in the morning were now either dead or injured. The afternoon wore on and the fighting continued. By 4 pm there were only four officers and seventy men remaining gathered together holding the German front line trench… it was now touch and go whether there was going to be a total rout. Of the seven battalions to start out seventeen hundred men were dead, two hundred were prisoners and over two thousand wounded. Most of these were lying about on the battlefield. The Germans systematically raked these with machine gun fire to kill them off, annoyed that now and again one of the wounded would start firing. In the evening, when the light was poor, stragglers started to drag themselves in. They were tired, hungry and distressed having got so far and not in the end succeeding. The Germans were moving about in No Man’s Land not only finding their own wounded but directing their first-aiders and stretcher-bearers to find the English wounded too. This concern for the wounded was reciprocated. There were 4,749 casualties in the London Division alone out of nearly 60,000. It was a seven to one battle, in favour of the Germans. The division remained on the Somme till October.  That August 1916 the Kensingtons were relieved by a Yorkshire brigade. They had been on the Somme further south, they were to take their place. Why there was this desire to alter the battalion’s position was never made clear. The destination was Abbeville for a rest period, before taking their place at the front… The Battalion had been withdrawn to re-equip and to train the new intake coming from the call for volunteers. The Commanding Officer was relieved to take over a battalion of Cheshires. In his place a Captain from another battalion, was made up to Major to take command. On the 3rd September, at 4 am the Kensingtons marched from Millencourt to the railway station at St. Riquier there to board a train to take them to Corbie. By mid-morning the battalion arrived, offloaded, and marched to Daours where, they were told, billets had been reserved for them. As they marched along orders were received that they were going to the wrong place – that they should be heading for Sailly-le-Sec. Halting the battalion, each company was ‘about turned’ and the whole moved off in reverse order following the road back through Corbie to reach their correct destination at about three in the afternoon… shortly afterwards their kit was delivered from Millencourt by the battalion transport. Even though the battalion had had a number of weeks at Millencourt to train and get to know the new replacements there was still a lot more to impart. These new intakes were not long out of training camps in England. Now the Kensingtons were up to strength for men, but for officers, there was a shortage [there were only 23 in the battalion]. Again my father was asked to take a commission – to take over command of his company, but again he refused wishing to retain his status and respect by his men. It is difficult from this distance to fully understand his thinking. He believed that his men were being led badly – by inexperienced officers. This should have been his opportunity to do something about it. As it was it was he who was giving the orders to his company for the sub-lieutenants relied upon him. Perhaps it was this that controlled his thinking? At Sailly-le-Sec the battalion were housed in tents. On the 6th orders were received  to obey all future commands from the 15th Brigade, the Kensingtons had been lent to the 15th  Brigade and ordered into line based on Chimpanzee Trench – between Maricourt and Trones Wood. Late that afternoon, the battalion were gathering up supplies of ammunition, rockets, grenades etc., stockpiled in preparation in Chimpanzee Trench by the 300 existing troops led by Major Deakin. Clutching their extra loads the battalion made its way into the advanced frontline positions, relieving the 7th Irish Fusiliers who were to form a reserve south of Angle Wood. Contained in the orders were additional instructions to try and extend the position in an easterly direction, digging in as close to the German trench as possible, whilst pushing out patrols into Combles to back-up the French who were also adopting a more aggressive stance. The H.Q. The command post was positioned in Chimpanzee Trench where the brigadier was installed. The Advanced H.Q. held the battalion signallers, and artillery spotters. It was the first battle the battalion was to experience using tanks to accompany the advance… It was clear that H.Q. had no real idea what the Kensingtons were to face – whether their trench was held by the Germans, in what numbers or what the state of play was in Combles? The orders had not been written without any understanding of the true position. The condition of the trenches was bad… it had been raining and the ground was under water. The battalion had to carry their loads in single file pushing their way past the troops who were already there. The guides provided to settle the men into line had only been there the day before and were unused to the exact location of the position. The day before the 7th Irish Fusiliers had attacked the Germans on the understanding that the position was only lightly held. Unfortunately the ground to the front was strongly guarded by barbed wire entanglements that had been hidden by the abundant growth of standing corn. The Germans had covered the area well with fixed lines covered by machine guns. The Fusiliers had lost 350 men. The survivors had hidden in shell holes. It was these holes that the Kensingtons joined together to make a forward position ready for the advance the following morning.  Now the tanks rolled forward for the first time. How the troop rejoiced in their inclusion thinking that they would grind away the confounded barbed-wire. Spending the night at the Citadel Camp after the exhausting march from Bray. The same afternoon the King rode by with a large number of staff officers. The Kensingtons were making for Fricourt after staying the night at Citadel Camp. Once there proceeded to off-load their packs and take up battle equipment. They were to relieve the 7th Royal Irish Fusiliers in trenches close to Falfemont Farm and Leuze Wood and the Warwickshire Regiment. Men from the 7th guided them in single file, officers leading, past a wood on to a rough track past wounded men going the other way. It was almost pitch dark as they made our way along keeping our free hand on the shoulder of the man in front. Occasionally there would be a blinding flash and thunderous crack as our artillery fired over our heads. Stretcher cases were trying to make their way past slipping and sliding with their charges groaning with pain. The men travelled for about seven miles taking fifteen hours to complete. Eventually slid down a narrow track with steep sides into Angle Wood Valley. On the right was an embankment at the top showing the stumps of Wedge Wood? The Kensingtons were on the extreme right of the British Army next to a French battalion. The two valleys running off the hill held an abandoned French machine-gun post with piles of empty cartridge cases. All this time the battalion was filing into position with the remnants of the Royal Irish Fusiliers going back – taken out of the line…? The RIF had reached as far as the corn fields that had concealed the German trench and barbed wire, in front of Combles… After suffering enormous casualties – losing half their strength, they now needed rest and their numbers making up.  On the left of the ridge there was a trench full of dead German soldiers. They were Prussian Guards without their outer uniforms just wearing their white vests. The bodies were stacked up on top of each other making it difficult to make a way through them. At last we reached the shell holes that had been linked together taking over from the remaining Irish Fusiliers. Our immediate job was to try and reform the trench system. The Officer Commanding the Kensingtons was ordered to extend his line from the south corner of Leuze Wood and dig-in as close to the German trench as possible. During the night, the Kensingtons moved out to attack the German trench. Unknown to them the Germans had reinforced that part of their line – which had been previously lightly held. A bombardment was laid down by the Germans on the British troops, as they surged forward. They fell back, to reform, and try again. The battalion had been fully up to strength at the start of the battle, they, with the help of a flanking French battalion, were to advance upon Combles as the Germans, it was believed, had left it unoccupied – the General Staff thought the Germans would be in retreat after such a bombardment… this was not the case! The Kensington Commanding Officer split his battalion in two. Half were to take over the shell holes to their front and link them together – to form a trench. The other half battalion were to take over the old German trench and reverse the firesteps – to support the new trench being constructed. When all was quiet patrols were sent out to find out how strong the German position was and to take prisoners if possible. One patrol was to seek out the French battalion to find out what they had in mind – to link up the advance the next day. The patrols reported back that the German trench was strongly held with barbed wire entanglements firmly in place with no gaps. The French CO sent a detailed plan showing where their positions were and the extent of the numbers holding them. It was clear from the sketch that the French poison was not as advanced as previously thought. These plans and descriptions were sent back to the Brigade HQ. The Kensingtons CO held back from making a daylight attack the next day. That afternoon the French flanking battalion attacked to be repulsed, ending up back where they had started in the first place. As darkness fell that evening the Kensingtons moved out. The Germans became aware of movement to their front and called down a heavy bombardment on the advancing troops. The Kensingtons retired to reform and strike out again. But by now the Germans were fully alerted and kept up a steady machine gun fire. Again the Kensingtons were repulsed. In the morning the regiment advanced again towards the trenches in front of Combles, they stumbled upon uncut barbed wire, which had been hidden by the long grass. Very heavy fire from both machine guns and rifles was directed at them. A third of the regiment killed or wounded the rest fell back taking cover where they could. They started to try digging a trench to connect the shell-holes together. The Kensingtons tried to take Combles again that night but by then the Germans had reoccupied their trenches and alerted to this possibility. The Kensington’s were again strongly opposed only this time they had the added trial of a German barrage. These shells straddled both the newly dug trench and their original positions…the Kensingtons were caught in the middle, where they huddled in shell holes all night. After being berated by high command, the Commanding Officer decided to try again the next morning… The following day, on Sunday, a third try was prepared. The morning dawned clear and sunny… again the troops were ordered forward. There was only about half the regiment left and most of the officers had been either killed or wounded. It was a gallant effort but again it failed…! The Commanding Officer was ordered to report to the Battalion Headquarters where he was asked why they had failed to occupy the trench and conduct patrols to strengthen their position. He reported that he had not been ordered to do that in the first place and that his original orders had come from another brigade; he went on to report that his orders came via another brigade and that he did not know who was in charge of the operation. High Command ordered him to recommence the attack… After another tremendous bombardment, the artillery fire lifted to range onto the German second line trenches. The day’s rations eaten before the shelling had stopped washed down with water. The feeling was that they might as well die with a full stomach rather than have to carry extra weight. It also stopped the men from thinking about the tremendous racket made by the shelling. Many were feeling quite petrified although there was nothing one could do to relieve the tension. Cigarettes were passed round and lit. It was clear that if one talked continuously it made waiting that much easier. The conversation was about nothing in particular, just idle chatter. Overhead the Germans had raised balloons to observe the fall of their shot. The Royal Flying Corps were up taking pot shots of the balloons to try to bring them down. Some companies had moved forward into No Man’s Land. My father and his company climbed over the parapet and went towards the German lines. By moving rapidly, they reached the German trenches… there was not anyone about? It was not realised by the Allies how complicated and well-constructed the German positions were… the Germans were below ground in deep dugouts Shortly afterwards the German machine guns went into action. They had been hiding in their deep bunkers perfectly safe. As soon as the British shelling had stopped to allow their troops to move forwards up they popped pulling their guns up on ropes. The trenches had been prepared to take the machine guns to give them fixed lines that covered their front. They continuously fired their guns putting down a carpet of fire mowing everyone down. Albert found he was the only one standing; either everyone else was dead or wounded. He immediately jumped into a shell hole where he found a few others who had survived. There they stayed whilst the machine guns continued to blast away. Eventually the fire lifted and my father found they were up against the German trench parapet. Organising an advance he led his few men into the German trenches again only this time they knew they had to eliminate the Germans in their deep bunkers which they did with grenades. This battle continued long after it was realised it was a hopeless cause. Urged to maintain pressure on the Germans to relieve the French at Verdun these battles continued well into November. The ground resembled the imagined landscape of the moon. It was a shocking wilderness of mud, shell holes, flooded trenches and parts of bodies lying amongst discarded equipment. Four and a half months of turmoil had resulted in an advance of five miles. Both sides had lost nearly half a million men each. The Kensingtons were drawn back from the front to rest, shortly afterwards in Britain there was a call for volunteers. It could be seen that the war was not going to end soon – that there were going to be more large battles and many more deaths before the Germans were defeated. Quickly men rushed to join the colours. In the first eighteen months, two and a half million men were volunteers. It could be seen that the pick of these men were the finest the nation could produce…All through that winter of 1916 after the battles on the Somme, the weather had been awful with wind driven sleet and snow… but the Allies kept up the pressure. The local populace could not remember a colder winter, there were weeks of unbroken frost. Uniforms froze solid and could not be taken off before being partly unfrozen. Plans were afoot to restart the attacks on the front as soon as the weather improved… The Germans strengthened their line by giving up some less tactical parts to permit an easier defensible position. Their army was undoubtedly weaker. In mid-March the Germans pulled back to the Hindenburg Line constructed the previous year by the then Chief of Staff Von Hindenburg and his Quartermaster General Ludendorff. It stretched from the coast to Metz and was an extremely strong series of interlinking strong points and barbed wire entanglements.

The Allies plan devised by General Robert Neville was to launch a massive attack in the south – on the Aisne, whilst the British were to contribute by asserting pressure, with fourteen divisions, in front of Arras. This surprise attack was meant to guarantee victory in forty-eight hours. On the 4th April, a furious bombardment commenced. Once again the object was: to cut the wire, keep the Germans underground, knock out as many strongholds as possible and give hope and support to the waiting troops. This artillery effort had 2,800 guns firing a variety of calibres. The attack by the British troops began on the morning of the 9th April that included ten British and four Canadian divisions. The goal was to scale the Vimy Ridge heights. At the northern end of the line the attack was a brilliant success as the troops backed up by tanks forced the heights on a three mile front. Ten thousand prisoners were captured, strongholds blasted flat and many guns destroyed and captured. However, at the southern end of the ridge the battle see-sawed backwards and forwards for five days… the Germans directing more and more reserves forward. Five days later the British attack was halted to allow the French to advance to the Aisne… The French tried hard to keep the pressure up but the offensive turned into a colossal failure as the Germans started to press forward. The French injected further fresh troops which together made fifty-four divisions attempting to hold the tide. Mutiny took place as Frenchmen refused to take up arms. Nivelle was sacked and Marshal Petain installed as the new Commander-in-Chief. Around Arras, General Haig continued to attack into May. They were costly advances. The Kensingtons played an important part for over nine weeks having to re-enter the line on a number of occasions. The Kensingtons were directed to take up quarters not far from the station of Rue du Saumon. All the houses adjacent to the station had their cellars linked together. These quarters had been occupied by each army in turn as the battles seesawed backwards and forwards. The men were detailed off sleeping on all the floors of each of the houses still standing. The battalion was taken out of the line and the majority of men were found room in the Schramm Barracks. The whole place was crowded with troops from Canada and South Africa. On the 9th April, there was launched, on a front of fourteen miles, the Battle of Arras. The most important feature was Vimy Ridge, which stands two or three miles to the north of Arras. The men still had to put up with the atrocious weather conditions. When the battle commenced on Easter Monday there was a strong south-westerly squall, rain and sleet and even snow flurries hampered the build-up in the front lines. As usual there were some successes but the bad weather played a part in stopping observation by the Royal Flying Corps – to give the fall of shot. A week later there was launched to the south an offensive by general Nivelle who had prophesied it would be a day of glory for France. It turned out to be an appalling disaster, partly because the Germans had acquired the plans for the French attack. The French were soundly beaten and broken… they were on their knees. The failure by the French meant that the British had to not only withstand their own pressure received from the Germans but push forward with even greater force to take some of the pressure off the French front. General Haig had to continue the battle longer than he wanted to. It was during that week that the United States entered the war against Germany. Towards the end of April 1917 Douglas Haig completed his plans for the campaign in Flanders, something he had always wanted but was dissuaded by Nivelle. Over the next three weeks the already tired troops were told to keep up the pressure and go on the attack. During May these attacks failed at Cambrai. The Kensington battalion stayed on the Arras front for over two months, not always at the same sector for they were occasionally rested… to return to some other position. The battalion took up residence of some villages behind the line. Afterward returned to Beaurains – in reserve. There the men helped construct a new camp using corrugated iron. Once again the weather was awful – raining continuously. On the 3rd May the British Army made a gallant attack at a quarter to four in the morning on the Hindenburg Line along a front of sixteen miles, the most formidable was the section around Bullecourt, ten or so miles to the southeast of Arras. They broke through in many places but their successes were short-lived because the enemy threw in a series of counter-attacks. There took place what was known as the Third Battle of the Scarp.  For two years the British miners had been tunnelling under the ridge constructing twenty-one mines of which two failed to detonate, the other nineteen succeeded. The German knew this was going on but not the scale of exact whereabouts. The massive explosion destroyed part of the German front line and support positions. The attack on the Messines Ridge was commanded by General Sir Herbert Plumer leading the British 2nd Army of nine infantry divisions from X, IX, and II Anzac Corps. Plumber had his orders extended to cover the first line, the second, the village of Wytschaete, and the reverse slope position… an advance of nearly two miles. He deployed massed artillery pieces whose job it was to saturate the German lines – to be taken, and return fire – to eliminate German artillery positions. The creeping barrage was followed up by tanks and infantry who achieved their aim – the village of Messines in the first phase, an hour after the explosion. The second phase, the village of Wytschaete, fell two hours after that. This June offensive was a success achieving its objectives with fewer casualties than expected launched once again in the early hours of the 7th June 1917… starting by this enormous explosion – from a series of nineteen gigantic mines at 3.10, that exploded underneath the ridge itself… and was even heard in London. This literally blew the Germans off the ridge.  Initially the attack was a success achieving all the first objectives. The British and Empire Forces immediately occupied the ridge… they quickly reassembled the trenches reversing the firing steps and parapet. Several attempts were made by the Germans to retake the line but to no avail – they were not strong enough. Unfortunately Douglas Haig was asked to attend a meeting with the Politicians in London. These meetings lasted six weeks and during this time when the weather was at its best the moment was lost, impetus drained away. The storming of the ridge at Messines and the opening of the larger offensive cost the British troops dearly. By the time Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the British Expeditionary Force’s Commander-in-Chief returned from England, the Germans had found some reserves, even thinning out troops in the front line opposite the French, who were in no position to take advantage. Haig believed the German Army was on its last legs – near to collapse after the battles of The Somme and Arras. The British Grand Plan, its primary motive, was to break out of the salient and open up a route to the Belgian coast and the U-boat harbours – to relieve the strain on the multi-national merchant fleet – stop the sinking of desperately needed supply vessels. At the end of June there was a series of separate attacks made by Britain’s Army. The culmination is recorded under a number of titles [indicated] Third Battle of Ypres. It was the start to total misery. The British command attacked the Imperial German Army… the object: to seize the village of Passchendaele. As secondary motives: to deny the Germans the better defended ridge… to take some of the strain off the French at Verdun, who were having morale problems… to deflect the German submarine campaign… to hinder the German bombers offensive on mainland England. The British War cabinet approved the plan for the summer offensive – to begin on the 20th July 1917. A vast number of artillery pieces were assembled whose task was to completely flatten the German trenches, supply dumps and strongholds. Eleven days were calculated in which to accomplish this task. The picture facing the British was one of a low lying ridge that gave the defending enemy better observation of the plain. This, the British observed from a naturally swampy plain without any redeeming features. The farmland had been criss-crossed with drains and ditches seeking natural escape routes for the water. These watercourses had been blasted away over the previous months that not only upset the natural flow of water but redirected storm water. That summer the weather had been unusually wet. British and Commonwealth troops attacked, making a spectacular advance quickly. That summer was a particularly wet one… during the bombardment the rain started falling… off and on, during the whole period… turning into a heavy drizzle on the day of the attack. The battlefield was a quagmire. Nevertheless the troops mostly achieved their allotted tasks. The Germans, in their organised manner, had prepared on the ridge deep fortifications, blockhouses, pillboxes and defensive positions with linking defile trenches protected by staked barbed wire, all covered against enfilading fire. These defended positions formed four lines facing the British and a further line on the reverse slope. Adopting their newly devised plan of lightly defending the forward position, keeping the body of their troop below ground in deep shelters and retaining reserves in counter-attacking positions, they awaited the battle. The manner of defence was replicated at both the villages of Messines and Wytshaete. To consolidate the newly won positions and to plan the next advance took six weeks. During this delay the Germans improved their defences by installing another strategic defence line to the south, and a further one on the reverse slope. The existing machine-gun emplacements were resisted to take into consideration the new, extra, defence line. The battle started about the middle of July led by General Sir Herbert Gough. Its task was to take the Gheluvelt Plateau, which was preceded by a four-day bombardment. The Germans knowing that this probably heralded an attack moved more troops to the defences. Appreciating the significance of the prolonged barrage they prepared their new offensive weapon mustard gas. After the bombardment the British attacked forcing their way up the slight ridge gaining over a mile. The British were learning the hard way that it is better to plan carefully to achieve a limited objective then defend it. The artillery also responded to the counter-battery with more precision knowing the Germans would follow up the attack to expel the invaders. The battalion enlisted at Liencourt to be deposited at St Omer, there to march to the villages of Houle and Moule to get ready for the next battle. It was the most wonderful weather. The countryside had never looked better and the river sparkled. If there was anything which put everyone in good spirits it was the sun allowing everyone to wash and wash their clothes? But it wasn’t for long before we had to take an old grey painted London bus to Abeel and onwards to take part in the 3rd Battle of Ypres. The journey was filled with singing and shouting as we journeyed along the county roads past woods, meadows and fields of hay. We reached the village on the Franco-Belgium border. We all fell-in to be marched to Steenvoorde. The villages did not look particularly inviting. Marching along feeling quite jolly arrived at Mic-Mac Camp close to Dickebush, there being several Nissen huts. Now we were in the battle zone where the roads and fields were pock marked with shell holes filled with water. The village of Ouderdom was only a mile or so away. We continued marching getting nearer and nearer to the sounds of battle at last entering the village were directed to a disused brewery. There was no singing now, only a grim deadly look of resignation. Everyone quietened down knowing that shortly we were to go to the front. After staying in the village for a few days we set off again towards Ypres. On the 15th August 1917 the weather was threatening and the storm clouds complimented our depressed feeling. We continued marching in open formation passing Shrapnel Corner. On the right the walls of the city and on the left the moat which ran parallel to the front. Over this devastated area the battle raged. It was described as a nightmare casualty station… was inundated – they were shelled by day and bombed at night. The scene in the horse lines was horrible. Lines of horses blown to pieces others stampede around helplessly with torn limbs. Any attempt to move in the thick mud and filled shell hole was impossible. Any straying meant drowning without being able to move from the cloying mud. The Germans drew breath praying for more rain which was their greatest saviour. At Estree Blanche another attack was made but the weather took another turn for the worst and the attack faltered. In August the weather broke and the month of August became the wettest known in that part of Flanders. The artillery attack left the ground pock-marked by shell holes that filled up with water. Before troops could advance a path of duck-boards had to be laid following tapes laid by the Pioneers. The next two weeks saw both sides engaged in repeated artillery barrages – each side trying to outdo the other in weight of fired shot and saturation. The battalions took it in turn to keep up the attack throughout the fortnight. On the 16th August the Battle of Langemarck was launched just before dawn. Eight divisions were assigned to create an enormous shove on a wide front. The day before, expeditionary forces were pushed forward to clear the ground before the main attack… over-running several strongholds including the main fortification of Au Bon Gite, which although surrounded, held out. The battle see-sawed backwards and forwards, but the attacking troops had secured a vital foothold across the Steenbeek. This was essential to the main attack the following night. The 60th and 61st Brigades would be able to cross and form up within striking distance of the German trenches the next morning… to allow the main body of troops, coming up behind, to pass through the hoped for break in the German line. The 2nd British Army took over from the 5th. Bringing General Plumer into action again. He decided to take the offensive towards the southeast along the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge using limited action, then taking a firm stance – to hold on to what was gained. There were three objectives – a series of lines five hundred yards apart, identified by the colours blue, green and red. The two-hundred attacking troops in the first wave were to hold the first position – defined by the road on the western side of the village, this was the blue line… They were to stay there for twenty minutes before following up. The second wave passed through these men holding the road… setting out to attack and clear the village stopping at the far side to reform and dig in. The third wave then passed on through the two former lines, to secure a third, red line, marked by a series of German trenches. When the third wave attacked the trenches the first would be following up in a supporting role. The green, when their role of keeping the German heads down over would then join in. Meanwhile, the artillery would fire a creeping barrage in front of the leading troops – to form a curtain of fire and to pulverise the enemy. Signallers were detailed off to lay a line behind the leading troops to allow artillery observers to report back. This barrage would lift every five minutes one-hundred yards… until the German trench was reached, and then a final lift of two hundred yards… to deter any possible counterattack to take back the trench. This final artillery contribution would allow the sized German trench to be fitted with new firing steps and machine gun positions. This was the plan for the capture of Langemarck; all the attacking troops took part in necessary training for the battle at the beginning of August. The planners meant this to herald a breakout which demanded that the various stages be rigidly kept – so that the overlapping waves would provide the support for the leading troops. This demanded the men should not be weighed down by having to carry their packs which were left behind to be kept in store… there was going to be enough extra ammunition and equipment to be carried as it was! Before all set piece battles the men played cards, told stories and busied themselves to take their minds off what was to happen. Two days rations were passed out and the water carriers struggled to fill up the water bottles. The officers instructed the sergeants what the plan was so that the men could be told what their particular tasks were to be. Flares were issued to be lit to indicate when they reached the German trench. The night of the attack was cold and it was raining hard. The troops formed a single file all along the Yser Canal keeping as quiet as possible. At 22.30 hrs. They moved off crossing the water, keeping a hundred yards between each of the four companies. An hour later, after making their way over planks laid over the worst stretches, the way indicated by white tape, the men were allowed to rest. Starting again their march continued, still making use of the carefully prepared track by the pioneers the previous night. Crossing over the road and keeping the railway line on their left then over the stream the first wave arrived at the assembly line on the far side of the Steenbeek. The German front line was very close – only about eighty yards away, the leading troops could hear the Germans talking. It was clear that the Germans had no idea of what was about to happen. At 4.30 the artillery started to pulverise the German position… then ceased firing to allow the attack to go in. The ground had been stirred up by the bombardment making it even more pockmarked. The forward line of troops was knee deep in mud. The attack was going well and the Germans did not have a chance to retaliate. As the waves passed through each other the artillery lifted their fire. At 5.00 the battalion was in position. The attacking troops found that the opposition was lighter than expected. The bombardment was having the desired effect. The Germans were in confusion. The barbed wire had been cut and flattened. As the first to reach the trench jumped in there was hand to hand fighting. The bombers were out moving along the trench throwing their bombs down into the dugouts. Men were detached to search out documents, maps and orders trying to identify the Germans who had been manning the trench. Anything of interest was collected and sent back to headquarters. The supporting troops using their Lewis guns caused many casualties allowing many prisoners to be taken. The red line had been reached and the attacking force was digging in, reversing the firing steps and mounting the machine guns to cover their front. The forward battlefield was now empty. No attack in the past had occurred without the Germans reacting by trying to retake lost ground. There was no reason to suppose that this was not going to happen here. Enemy aircraft were flying overhead no doubt surveying the ground reporting on the condition and numbers of opposing forces. At 17.00 hrs. There was movement ahead and the British observers were blowing their whistles. Orders were given to stand up and receive the enemy. The Germans were about a battalion in strength. The order was given to open fire including the now mounted and positioned Lewis guns. A green rocket was fired to alert the artillery to lay down a barrage. This had the desired effect for the Germans who gave up and disappeared. There was a second attack two and a half hours later but this too failed to dislodge the British. Patrols were sent out throughout the night but it remained calm. The following morning, the 17th August, the orderly teams were collecting and issuing the battalion’s breakfast, topping up water bottles and issuing ammunition. The Germans were firing a morning hate barrage directing their fire at the farm and Langemarck… this continued practically all day. That evening a minor attack was made to secure a short section of trench the Germans had retaken. This was soon accomplished forcing the Germans to leave in rather a hurry… ending the operation as the 20th Division moved into reserve. The battle was over by eleven, and by that time the reversing of the firesteps completed, there was now time to allow the men to take it in turns to rest, clean up and have a smoke. The place was in utter shambles. All the craters were half filled with water. The bodies of the dead and wounded littered the ground. The wounded were crying out and the stretcher parties were moving about collecting up the worst cases. It sometimes took six men to move one wounded soldier because the sticky mud was at knee height and the shell holes had to be straddled as the water squelched out at each step. A section of German 4.2-inch howitzers and one 77-mm field gun had been captured and a number of pillboxes and strongholds put out of action. This part of the battle had been a success with relatively few casualties… however; the battle in the south was a disaster with 15,000 casualties and very little gain. The afternoon went by and the Germans never tried to retake the trench… which was a relief, as the men were pretty done in. Those who had slight wounds made their way back to the casualty station. Each battalion had their own stretcher bearers who were busy. They had received sufficient first aid to attempt to stop wounds bleeding and to prepare the wounded for the journey back to the rear… three-quarters of a mile away, over the other side of the Steenbeek, and then a further three-quarters of a mile to Gallwitz Farm which was the Forward Advanced Dressing Station. On the morning of the 18th August the survivors were then taken by either horse-drawn ambulance or placed on trolleys using the light railway lines to be patched up at the FADS then shipped to England.

The battalion marched to the proven camp to recuperate. New drafts were sent towards the end of the month to make up for the injured and dead. As soon as the new draftees were placed, training was undertaken – to instruct the new men about trench warfare. On the 9th September the battalion returned to the front to act initially as salvage collectors – to scavenge for weapons left on the field of battle. Once again there was a tremendous bombardment meant to soften up the opposition, flatten the strong-hold and break-up the wire. The Allies attacked and managed to hold on despite counterattacks. At last there seemed to be a solution to prepared positions. This required guns to be ranged accurately using all calibres and shells to creep forward closely followed up by the infantry to gain achievable goals then taking stock to reform and start again. Ypres was the key position that affected the whole sector. The city had exacted a terrible toll on both sides. As the Kensington battalion marched along the road past the city walls we reached the Menin Gate, turning right and continuing over a wooden bridge past the Zillebeke Lake. Ahead there was a trench system topped by a mound making the whole area a fortified bastion. Batteries of guns were firing over our heads as we carried on towards the Westhoek Ridge. It was then that the Battalion Major was killed together with the Adjutant, as the Regimental Sergeant Major lay wounded. Captain Shaw took over coming from Brigade to take over from Captain Venables.The Germans were putting up a heavy barrage as the remainder of us doubled along the Menin Road past the dressing station of Half-Way House. Lines of German prisoners were passing as the Kensingtons made their way quickly along the road until they reached the pill-box. This took place during the Third battle of Ypres, starting off on the morning of the 26th of September. It was planned as a jumping off point for a direct assault on the Ridge that had as its focal point the village of Passchendaele. The troops were marched into line making their way from the road to the torn and shell holed track that led to the communicating trench. At one time this had been well dug with duckboards and dugouts, firing points and steps well placed with looped sandbags facing the enemy… Now it was a shambles with bits of equipment and bodies sticking out from the slimy mud with two feet of water contaminated with an evil smelling scum. When all was quiet at night the rats came out stealing the rations and foraging amongst the litter. The men asleep covered their faces with a blanket even though they could feel the rats running over them. The rats had no fear, hardly taking any notice of the happenings around them. Stray dogs roamed the battle fields looking for scraps of food shivering and shaking as the guns boomed out. It did not take long for the men to become battle hardened. If they didn’t smoke before they did now… it was a nerve calming habit promoting a sense of togetherness, as they all lit up. All men suffered from fatigue and exhaustion, many having the shakes. No-one took any notice or made a remark but most engaged in mindless conversation, although no-one listened. This occurred the closer the time came to go over the top. Instructions would be continually repeated. The butterflies in the stomach made you breathless, the loose bowel, hands that would not keep still and the eyebrow that twitched…, they rocked backwards and forwards on the squelching duckboards… waiting their turn… Again the artillery put down a barrage prior to the order to advance… you could feel the ground shake and tremble. The noise of the whistles and bangs… the whine and rushing sound. Every man had to stand firm. Occasionally a man was hit by shrapnel or an unlucky bomb burst. The cry for ‘stretcher bearer’ rings out as the word was passed along the line. Somebody had bought it. When would it be my turn? Much of the south side of the ridge had been captured by the first of October. It had been a tremendous slog by the British 2nd and 5th Armies. The later attack managed to pass through the German defences to the depth of one mile. Just over a week later the two armies pushed forwards again – on Passchendaele itself, after two days of continuous heavy rain. It had been a grim business. It was almost impossible to comprehend how troops could continue in such conditions. There appeared to be no change to the strategy and tactics. The troops had to just carry on with the Battle of Flanders capturing Passchendaele three days later. Whilst the battle for Passchendale was being raged another was in progress. Poelcappelle was proving to be a harder nut to crack for it was a complete failure with very little to show for the 13,000 casualties. The British 5th. The Army once again was being asked to create a diversion by attacking Houthulst Forest, Malmaison and northeast of Poelcappelle. At first only slight gains were made. Later on the right flank succeeded in capturing the rest of Poelcappelle. This was, and is still called, ‘The greatest martyrdom of the World War. The four divisions of the Canadian Corps were transferred to the Ypres Salient relieving the Anzac Corps on the 18th October. Ypres lies at the western end of a low-lying plane circled by woods and hills. It lies behind the front line by some two miles and some five miles beyond- further east, is the actual village of Passchendaele. In-between the town of Ypres and village of Passchendaele flows the river Yser… dotted about, numerous canals and streams, all part of the field drainage system – all not much above sea-level guarded by the Pommern Redoubt. From the river the ground rises… to the village of Gravenstafel and there, further up the valley, perched on the heights… the village of Passchendaele, a gentle climb up to the ridge. It is important to picture: all military attacks were preceded at that time by an artillery barrage…This was either a total bombardment that could last for days or a creeping barrage began just before the battle to saturate the ground in advance of the attacking troops. The Ypres plain was like a basin – the river running through the centre had created water meadows on either side making much of the grassland marshy. Past generations of farmers built a series of canals, channels, ditches and water-courses to drain away the surface water – to make the land productive. Naturally: any breaking or damage of that drainage system would recreate the marsh. The weather was unexpectedly wet – it rained continually…Three separate attacks were planned, each given a day to achieve. The British 5th Army were to mount a diversionary operation on the left [Pilckem Ridge] and the 1st. Anzac on the right [Nonne Boschem]. The start date was 26th October 1917. The bombardment began on 22nd July employing 3,000 guns, well in advance of the start date. This shellfire: transformed the area into a pock-marked swamp two miles wide, full of quicksand capable of drawing man and horse beneath its surface. The 3rd Canadian Division kicked off advancing up the northern flank towards Bellevue spur. The 4th Canadian Division made Decline Copse. Altogether the Canadians achieved all their objectives but were eventually forced back by repeated German counterattacks. The second stage, four days later, was to mop up what had not been cleared on the 26th. And secure a base on the Passchendaele crest… A number of strongly held farms were assaulted and captured. By the 10th November the Third Battle of Passchendaele succeeded, costing the Canadians Corps 15,654 casualties in 16 days of hard fighting. The Kensingtons took over the front line on the 12th November. In support were the 3rd London’s bringing up full battle equipment. This was the first battle to be ordered that was not preceded by an artillery bombardment. Headquarters had come to the conclusion that a pre-bombardment only alerted the enemy to an impending attack – allowing the German troops to retire from the front line – to return after the artillery had moved forward. On the eve of the battle the 167th and the 169th Brigades were holding the front. Their task was to create a diversion making it look as if they were the attacking party using many different ploys to seek that effect. The 168th Brigade was in reserve. When the battle began it became obvious that the ruse had been a success. The troops followed the tanks penetrating the Hindenburg Line on a wide front. The 36th Division on the right of the 56th advanced from Denicourt the 169th linked up with them later that morning. By the end of the day there was a large bulge in the line, eight miles wide by four deep. The advance was stopped by the Germans short of the Bourlon Wood which covered a ridge. Douglas Haig on the 22nd decided to carry on the attack. Both the Brigades 167th and the 169th were ordered to attack the Hindenburg Line. The next day the 168th were thrown into the fray, Tadpole Copse now the objective. The Kensingtons, with Lieut-Colonel Shaw in command, marched the Brigade to Le Bucquiere, along the Cambrai Road. The following night they took up residence vacated by the Rangers and the \Fusiliers about the Louvel Wood. The London Scottish were occupying the Hindenburg Line pushing their way towards Tadpole Copse. C Company of the Kensingtons started to dig a trench from the original front line to the crater. A Company took over defending the right flank. When the trench had been dug C Company went to the rear to carry up battle stores. In the morning the rest of the Battalion moved in to relieve the Fusiliers. The Battalion was now in a confusion of trenches, dug-outs and strongholds totally unknown to them. They could hear the Germans but not see them. In the morning the Germans put in a determined attack, shelling the line. It was clear that the Germans would attack again. For the first time tanks were used. The attack started in the early morning with a large number of tanks [381] opening the way ahead for the infantry. Great advances were made including a breaching part of the Hindenburg Line defences. The heavy tank assault broke through the enemy lines into clear ground ahead opening up a marvellous chance to forge ahead. But no reserves were available to take over the territory gained. Before anything could be arranged the Germans had once again sealed the breach and they counter-attacked. In the end the battle was called off and the Germans retook all the ground they had lost. The battle ended with a withering blizzard and the snow drove everybody below ground. Although the battle had only lasted two weeks the figures of the casualties again leave the mind dazed at the stupidity of it all. Forty-five thousand on each side. We took eleven-thousand prisoners and the Germans took nine thousands of ours. There was to be no more major assaults for the rest of that winter. The Third Battle of Passchendaele depleted the number of troops available to exploit the gains made at the Battle of Cambrai which showed the capabilities of massed tank action. At the end of November, beginning of December, The Kensingtons were relieved by the Gordon Highlanders and Black Watch to take up a rear reserve camp at Roclincourt. A few weeks later we were off again to Bailleul south of Vimy Ridge after a couple of days taken out of the line to celebrate Christmas 1917 back in Roclincourt Camp.

On the 5th December 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks agreed a truce signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the 3rd March 1918. The terms were high. Russia had given up Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine. This allowed the Germans to move many of their troops to the western front freeing up stocks of ammunition. By the 15th February 1918, the Germans had two armies stationed to attack between Ypres and La Bassee, and five more between Arras and Reims. The Kensingtons meanwhile having handed over to the Scots marched to the transport lines near Fremicourt. After a week of route marches and wagon rides adjacent to Vimy Ridge… finally marched up the ridge to the long communication trench leading down to the trenches in front of the village of Oppy. Once again the Kensingtons had their numbers made up as they prepared for the New Year’s battles. After the October Revolution and the overthrow of the Monarchy Russia negotiated a ceasefire. The Germans could now concentrate on the west – deal with a single opponent – the Allies. As soon as the peace treaty was signed they started to transport men and arms westwards in an attempt to create a victory before America could contribute. As soon as Haig heard of this he immediately realised his preparations should include a stockpile of ammunition. The Germans were about to field 191 Divisions against the Allies 164. There was a discrepancy of manpower which dictated that the Allies should stand firm and defend. The German offensive began on the 21st March [my father’s birthday] and was directed at Britain’s 5th Army who had been recuperating after the Battle of Cambrai and Passchendaele… The following year, 1918, it became a well-known secret that the Germans were being strongly reinforced – that they were preparing for an offensive that would be against the 5th Army. The RFC squadrons were bombing the German lines and airfields at Busigny, Bertry and Escaufourt. The build-up by the Germans was much larger than previous occasions. Their object was to smash through British lines before the Americans built up sufficient forces to make a difference. The German Offensive in Picardy became better known as The March retreat. On the 19th after a long spell of hot dry weather it started to rain with a heavy mist. All sights and sounds were dampened down and the enemy after some artillery fire became quiet. Both sides were oppressed by the enveloping fog. Suddenly there was an enormous crash as an artillery bombardment started. It was the most intensive bombardment staged since the beginning of the war. The St. Quentin sector was in the middle of it. The onslaught was massive. Gas was used and the order was given to put on gas-masks. The fog kept the gas close to the ground as it crept closer. Behind the gas the Germans started to penetrate the weak positions, feeling their way around strong points. Their reserves took their place as the main body moved forward. Ahead of the main force surged the storm-troopers equipped with automatic rifles and machine guns and light mortars. They made many openings in the British lines. The front had never been held by so few men and so few guns. Behind the British front line troops there were few reserves. The 5th Army had to cover forty-two miles with twelve infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. The Germans had forty-three divisions and by sheer weight of numbers began to push the British Forces back. There was a breakthrough at St. Quentin. The last of the British reserves were used up. A general order to retire was made. On 21 March an Operation called Michael, and the less important attack at Lys, began on the 9th April regained all the ground lost [6 miles] to the Allies the previous year… This was achieved by the Germans in three days. Many of the Brigades were decimated within a few hours. The German advance was finally halted before Amiens. During the second night it was realised that the Germans were massing again for another attack… The airfield at Flex had to be evacuated and right in the valley of the Somme columns of German troops could be seen advancing everywhere. They were advancing in hordes. The Royal Flying Corps delayed the advance but not sufficiently to stem the tide. Three days after launching the attack the Germans stood a good chance of driving a wedge in-between the 5th Army and the 3rd Army to the north. An ominous bulge began to form in the line once again the British Army fell back. The 4th Division faced seven German divisions in the ‘Mars’ offensive; the German advance was halted. It looked as if the Germans were making for the important railway centre at Amiens. On the 26th March the Germans were eventually held at Doullens. It was decided by the general Staff that the British troops should come under General Foch to coordinate the defence of the line. The following day the British held the line and the Germans began to falter once again, there was consternation. General Gough was relieved of his command. The magnificent fighting withdrawal left the Germans with extended lines to the extent it had to stop and regroup. As soon as the Germans halted without capturing Amiens or breaking through at Arras they tried to break through to Paris, then to the north towards the coast gaining some ground but the British line still remained complete and unbroken… each side losing nearly three hundred and fifty thousand men. Although it was a very testing attack for both Armies, for the Germans it was a very bitter pill, it convinced many that the war was not going to be won and their resources had drained away.

General Haig and Senior Officers (Haig took over from General Sir John French)

The Kensingtons entrained to be taken along the line to Watten, Houle and finally Bapaume.This was an old battle area, and looked to be desolate. The Germans had retired to high ground. We found our way to Le Transloy and the sugar factory. Thankfully the weather was fine and warm. On the 12th April 1918, the Germans became so threatening that Douglas Haig issued an order of the day – recognising the seriousness of the German attack – that all troops should stand firm. The lull between the Battle of Amiens and the continuation of the fighting at the Somme became known as the Battle of Bapaume. For a week during the end of August and the beginning of September the battle raged across the Somme. The front to the north and south had been pushed forward; there was a general advance of all the Allies along the whole front. The Germans were in full retreat – it was a total collapse of their lines. The weather helped being warm and dry making the ground suitable for tank movement. Douglas Haig issued to all commanders instructions that contained in them an indication of intent, that risks should be incurred as a duty – which it was no longer to advance in regular lines but to take what ground was won or offered. At the end of the month the Australians made a ferocious attack on Mont St. Quentin and Peronne, the last commanding positions left to the Germans. Mont St. Quentin is a rounded hill two miles to the north of Peronne. Their fortifications were of the strongest kind and the German troops were told to defend it to the last man. They put up tremendous resistance but were in the end overcome by the Australians who took the fortifications forcing the Germans to fall back on the Hindenburg Line. Away to the southeast the Americans were engaged in the hard fighting for Argonne. The battle opened up with the usual bombardment followed by massed infantry attacks. Within five days the Germans had reached Chateau Thierry on the river Marne. Some of the new American arrivals were attached to the British line. By June the Germans had pushed through the British line to the river, and beyond. It was a situation that called for desperate measures. All day long the 2nd Battalion Devon’s continued until darkness fell. In the morning the mist seemed to be clearing. Out of the murk the Devon’s saw the Germans advancing in lines bringing with them their guns and transport. When they got within range they were all mown down. This heroic stand partly took place in a wood the original trench had been blown up. Taking up position in another they turned to face the Germans who were so tightly packed together they could not be missed. The Devon’s made a last stand until finally out of ammunition charged the enemy. This triumphant last ditch attempt to stop the Germans disrupted their offensive and sapped their will. The battle began with the British 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies moving forwards to reach the fortifications capturing 116,000 prisoners. An attack on both flanks of the German forces was made by all the Allies in a piecemeal fashion to deceive the Germans. The German positions between Cambrai and St. Quentin were penetrated and the Allies surged on. The Hindenburg Line was formidable, having deep canal-trenches filled with water and wire making it difficult to get the men and tanks across. The thick impenetrable wire, massive concrete fortifications and earth banks were constructed in depth. The British artillery blasted away with a passion that was staggering. On the evening of the 26th of September all the front was in action. The troops were still to let the artillery bombard the front. For a time the Hindenburg Line held but finally the attack by the British, American and Australian troops succeeded – during the 29th September following a rain storm and dense fog during the night forward troops penetrated the defences. By the end of the next day the Germans were in full retreat.

Regimental Sergeant Major Albert Kearey

The night before Hindenburg agreed with Ludendorff that to save Germany from a catastrophe there must be an immediate armistice. The leaders prevaricate and the fighting went on… The moral of the German Army was in tatters the men were refusing to fight. During the last weeks of the war in October the Germans were in confusion. They had reached a line that ran along the western edge of the large Forest of Mormal and to the south of it the Sambre Canal. The line was back to where it had been at the beginning of the war four years before. On the 4th of November the Fourth Army launched its attack against the enemy positions along the Sambre canal. In the morning the German resistance broke down completely and all along the front the Germans Army fell back in an open and general retreat. The whole of the Allied troops moved forward eastwards by the British and north-eastwards by the Americans and French. The plight of the Germans became an impossible one. The German gamble had failed and Ludendorff resigned. By this time the division had suffered 34,809 casualties. The German Navy Mutiny at Kiel sparked off a revolution. On the 30th the Turks signed an armistice and on the 7th The German Government named their delegates for discussions about an armistice; on the 9th November the revolution sized Berlin; and on the 11th the armistice was signed. By the middle of October there were one million American troops in France creating two Armies. Their casualties, when the battle was over, were just over a quarter of the total… after being a full-scale force. On the 6th November the Kensingtons fought their last battle. They had been on the move for three days. The Germans intended to resist their passage and a heavy barrage of gas shells landed. The 169th Brigade was on the right and the 168th on the left. They, together with the London Scottish, advanced towards the River Grande Honnelle. A, joined with B, and C Companies were to keep in touch with the flank Brigades. After a tremendous artillery bombardment the advance was seriously in jeopardy. D Company was sent off in support to link with C. Together they were sent to the northern outskirts of the village where they found the enemy in possession. After clearing a number of Germans, taking many prisoners, the situation became clearer. At last the village was securely held as Battalion Headquarters was set up in the cellars of the church. The London Division received the Cease Fire order for 11am on the 11th November 1918. The order was given to the Kensingtons in Rieu de Bury. By this time all the roads and villages were completely devastated… This gave a great deal of work to tidy up – to allow passage through. The Kensingtons provided a body of troops to march with others in the First Army through the town of Mons on November 15th. On the 27th November the Kensingtons left Rieu de Bury and marched to Villers sire Nicole. They stayed for more than a month, including Christmas. Eventually demobilisation came to them allowing groups to slip away. The 1st Battalion had spent more than four and a half years in France and been through fourteen battles. Sergeant Major Albert Kearey was asked to stay on in France making sure all had been secured for the Kensingtons, including the wounded, until the Treaty had been signed in June 1919.

The war had a profound effect on my father whose life afterwards was never the same again. He relieved his time in French throughout the rest of his life, as I am sure many did. During the war, he lost four of his brothers and many of his friends. My father never trusted his Staff Officers and certainly not the Generals. He thought them inefficient and uncaring. His experiences played an important part in shaping his military service in the next war and clouded many judgements after. In 1918, there was a unity of command between the English and French Armies under the French Commander in Chief, Marshal Foch. The British and French had relied upon, to a major degree, a continuous sustained firepower from the artillery. This depleted the German Army, a fact not recognised until later by the High Command. Had they followed up immediately, victory would have come sooner? As it was, the eventual counter attacks made by tanks later on lead to ultimate victory, breaking the morale of the German Army. Ludendorff and The Kaiser both realised that the war could not go on. The Treaty of Versailles settled the fate of Germany and directed the course of events over the next twenty years, which led to The Second World War. The Armistice terms were signed in a railway carriage in the Forest of Compiegne. The terms forced Germany to give up all Allied territory, to withdraw her troops to the German side of the Rhine, to surrender all prisoners , and to hand over her fleet, aeroplanes, and guns.

In June 1919 the Treaty of Versailles settled the fate of Germany. The ‘war-guilt clause’ declared Germany responsible, demanding a sum of money to be paid annually to her conquerors, the Rhineland to be occupied by the Allied troops, and her coal field to be given to the French. France regained Alsace-Lorraine, Poland gained territory, and did Czechoslovakia, and Germany was to give up her colonies which were divided up amongst the Allies and reduce her army to 100,000. The treaty of Saint-Germaine brought an end to the Austro-Hungarian Empire – it was split up into racial elements. Two new states were made: Czechoslovakia, formed from the old Bohemia with Moravia and the Slovak area of Hungary, and Yugoslavia, an enlarged Serbia.

Poland was restored along with the republics of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. When the troops were demobilised the cry was, ‘Back to Normal’. Lloyd George had promised, ‘Britain would become, a land fit for heroes’. A General Election in 1919 retained the Coalition Party, mainly Conservatives, in power; led by Lloyd George… they remained in power until 1922. Unemployment was the most persistent problem. The returning troops were allowed to return to their old jobs. This naturally forced out those who had replaced them – those who were used to new production standards and methods brought about by mass production techniques. It also turned out most of the women who filled the jobs of conscripted men. The men returning were four years older, some had been promoted to senior ranks – given authority and responsibility. They found it difficult to cope with dissatisfied workers clinging to the shirt tails of Trade Union officials. Soon many began to feel disillusioned believing that they had sacrificed much, for a few to become rich. Industry began to feel the pinch as customers cut back.

Factories lost their contracts for armaments finding it hard to turn to peacetime products. Overseas customers had been neglected and the retooled factories had to compete with the then existing manufacturers. All this led to firms laying off workers. Unemployment soared and an economic crisis loomed ever larger. The dole queues lengthened…! 

Regimental Sergeant Major Albert Kearey DCM, MID2

Albert’s achievements were recognised by being awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM). In the citation it makes clear that he considered his men first, at all times, and felt responsible for their wellbeing, this consideration was acknowledged by being later made Regimental Sergeant Major. The citation reads: He showed the greatest energy and efficiency. Determined and cool in action. He has set an inspiring example to all the junior non-commissioned officers and men of his company. He was present at the First Battle of Ypres and Cambrai in 1917, the enemy offensive at Vimy Ridge in 1918, Arras the same year and later at Maubeuge’. For these battles he was mentioned twice in dispatches (MID).

Albert attended the Kensington Lodge with seven other Brethren presented with his Grand Lodge Certificate in the thirties. Later that year, at the Installation Meeting appointed Lodge Organist. By this time the family was living at Harvest Road, Bayswater. He was also a founder member of ‘The Old Contemptible Association.’ In about 1933 promoted to Regimental Sergeant Major. In 1940 at the outbreak of World War II promoted to Major of the 17th London Division which was still based at The Kensington Headquarters, there given command and the task to defend London from the north around Epping Forest from 1940-1944. 

Albert continued his story… soon after my return to work, taking up the position I had had in 1914, after being demobbed in 1919. My task then was to take on the congested and poorly maintained state of the railways. The Government allocated ex-military motors to the Railway Companies, and one morning 24 motors were received at Marylebone. We had no drivers, and I was instructed to obtain the services of temporary drivers and to give them a test in driving before they were taken on.  Later, other motors were offered, and I made three journeys with a number of drivers to Slough depot to pick up cars which were embraced: AEC, Peerless, Pierce Arrows and Commer types.  The question then arose of the employment of these motors, and I submitted to the Cartage Manager details of horse team working which could be “married” so as to make up rounds or districts for some of the motors to work on.  These were adopted, and later, I was asked to review the carters’ timesheets of Kings Cross and Bishopsgate for the same purpose. 

The 1919 National strike then occurred, and I was asked to take out a motor, which I did, and deliver loads.  I also helped to feed horses at Lodge Road and took a load of food to the horses at Limehouse, also blankets and food to the Royal Navy stokers at Neasden Power Station. Part of my job was to make up districts for delivery so that all of Marylebone was covered. 

I came on duty every morning at 8.00 am to supervise the working of the motors and to get them out without loss of time.  The Cartage Managers outdoor representative Mr Thompson arrived each morning at 8.40 am, and any motor left in the station by that time had to be explained and accounted for.  We had no Road Motor Engineer or repair staff, and the same procedure was adopted for all drivers to make sure their vehicle was fit for use. I think that I must have been the oldest cartage clerk in the service of the Company, and there are few who have had the cartage experience which has fallen to my lot.

In 1920, it became apparent that my mother was becoming distraught after losing four sons in battle, every day that went by was a reminder to her of her great loss. Alfred my father had died December 20th 1917 whilst I was still in France. It was believed he had died of a broken heart. At last the family adopted Edward Albert Kenneth in 1920 who was the darling of her heart that went some way to relieve the terrible loss. 

The Kearey family moved once more this time to Ellington Place.

Up to 1925, the Cartage staff at Marylebone were regarded as Thompson McKay personnel, and were debarred from applying for vacancies shown in the railway vacancy lists.  This accounts for why I was still in the Cartage Department, reminded by those to whom I had applied for a post, I had no experience in Railway matters, which was obviously untrue, and therefore could not be considered for promotion. After 45 years’ service spent in the Company’s service one feels time has been wasted – ill recognised, seeing that since 1919 the only promotion given has been a step in grade equal to £30 P.A.

It is quite apparent that the trauma of WW1 was too much for Albert to recount in his story.  His eldest brother, Frederick Augustus, was killed at Bray Sur Somme August 24th, 1918.  His next brother, Alfred Ernest was killed December 3rd, 1917 in Boulogne Wood, France. Walter Ambrose died in Suva Bay in Gallipoli, November 28th, 1915 from cold and starvation. Sydney Reginald was killed in action September 20th, 1917 in St Julien, Ypres.

Alfred and Martha were broken hearted and their feelings were shown very deeply in notes made by Martha in her family bible, and it would seem that she felt that Alfred died of a broken heart.  She says “Dear Father died December 20th 1917.  His last message ‘…if I fall asleep do not wake me.  I am so tired, Mother of Jesus.’ He fell asleep quarter to one in the morning. At rest” Fred was home on leave. Martha, distraught at the loss of her sons and beloved husband, was able, to her delight, to adopt Edward Albert Kenneth in 1920. My father went to war a devout Christian and died a disbeliever after witnessing first-hand the war in France.